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Search theory contributes significantly to fundamental and applied research, and 
is relevant for understanding many phenom-
ena that are troublesome for classical eco-
nomics. Examples include the coexistence of 
unemployment and vacancies; price or wage 
 dispersion and stickiness; bid-ask spreads; the 
difficulties of bilateral trade that generate a 
role for money and intermediation; partner-
ship formation; long and variable durations 
in the time to execute trades in labor, hous-
ing, and other markets; et cetera. This essay 
surveys a branch of the area concentrating 
on directed search and competitive search 
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 equilibrium. While the plan in what follows 
is to go into considerable detail on the lit-
erature, to give a hint up front, we mention 
influential papers by Peters (1984, 1991), 
Montgomery (1991), Shimer (1996), and 
Moen (1997).1
To be precise, for our purposes, an eco-
nomic model has two components: an envi-
ronment, including descriptions of the set of 
agents with preferences and technologies; 
and a mechanism or solution concept map-
ping environments onto outcomes. Directed 
search is a feature of the environment. To 
explain this, first note that in search the-
ory agents are modeled as trading with 
each other, and often bilaterally, different 
from Walrasian theory, where they simply 
trade with (slide along) their budget lines.2 
Directed search means agents see some, 
although perhaps not all, characteristics of 
other agents, and based on that choose where 
to look for counterparties. This contrasts with 
random search, where meetings are exoge-
nous. The characteristics of agents in most 
of the models described below include their 
posted terms of trade—generally contracts, 
although sometimes these are simply prices. 
This contrasts with traditional search models 
that assume agents bargain after they meet, 
and also with those that assume price posting 
when the posted terms do not influence who 
meets whom.
While directed and random search are 
different approaches that can be applied in 
 single-agent decision theory, competitive 
search equilibrium is solution concept map-
ping environments into outcomes. While 
1 Highlighting a few papers like this was suggested by a 
referee, but it is not easy to know where to draw the line. 
Other early related work includes Sattinger (1990) and 
Hosios (1990); one might also say the papers reviewed in 
section 5 were early and foundational; etc.
2 Some search models do have Walrasian pricing, for 
example, Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Rocheteau and 
Wright (2005) in labor and goods markets, respectively, 
motivated by saying agents meet in large groups and not 
bilaterally.
there is not complete consensus on usage, 
we take a stand: competitive search equilib-
rium means that agents on one side of the 
market post the terms of trade, while agents 
on the other side observe what is posted 
and direct their search accordingly. This 
can be applied in environments with finite 
or infinite numbers of agents; the situation 
where these numbers are sufficiently large 
that certain strategic considerations can 
be ignored is called perfectly competitive 
search equilibrium.
Consider any two-sided market with, for 
example, buyers and sellers, firms and work-
ers, or borrowers and lenders, trying to get 
together in pairs. Traditional search assumes 
they meet exogenously, at random, although 
whether a meeting results in trade can be 
endogenous. Directed search is different 
because agents use the information to tar-
get their search toward particular types, and 
sometimes even particular individuals. This 
can be based on primitive characteristics of 
agents—for instance, buyers can search for 
sellers of particular goods—and on endog-
enous characteristics like the posted terms 
of trade. In competitive search, equilibrium 
resources are allocated through the terms 
of trade plus the probability of trade. This 
is distinct from Walrasian theory, where 
trading probabilities play no role, and from 
traditional random search models, where 
prices have a relatively minor allocative role.3 
Competitive search thus integrates elements 
of general equilibrium (GE) theory and 
3 As Hosios (1990) says about labor, 
Though wages in bargaining models are 
completely flexible, these wages have nonethe-
less been denuded of any allocative or signaling 
function: this is because matching takes place 
before bargaining and so search effectively pre-
cedes wage-setting…. In conventional market 
situations, by contrast, firms design their wage 
offers in competition with other firms to prof-
itably attract employees; that is, wage setting 
occurs prior to search.
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 traditional search theory, yet is still tractable 
and often delivers clean results.
Further, in terms of realism, Howitt 
(2005) puts it like this:
In contrast to what happens in [random] 
search models, exchanges in actual market 
economies are organized by specialist traders, 
who mitigate search costs by providing facili-
ties that are easy to locate. Thus when people 
wish to buy shoes they go to a shoe store; when 
hungry they go to a grocer; when desiring to 
sell their labor services they go to firms known 
to offer employment. Few people would think 
of planning their economic lives on the basis of 
random encounters.
Even more colorfully, Hahn (1987) says 
“someone wishing to exchange his house 
goes to estate agents or advertises—he does 
not, like some crazed particle, wait to bump 
into a buyer.”  And Prescott (2005)  says “I 
think the bilateral monopoly problem has 
been solved. There are stores that com-
pete. I know where the drug store and the 
supermarket are, and I take their posted 
prices as given. If some supermarket offers 
the same quality of services and charges 
lower prices, I shop at that lower price 
supermarket.”
Whether or not they realize it, while 
attempting to critique traditional search 
theory, these commentators with their 
pithy remarks are all describing facets of 
directed or competitive search. Our view 
is that there is a role for random matching 
models, with bargaining or other means for 
determining the terms of trade, but it is also 
good to know the alternatives. The models 
presented below provide a class of alterna-
tive that is becoming increasingly popular 
and has proved useful in many applications. 
After discussing details of the various models 
and applications, we will say more about the 
advantages and disadvantages of the alterna-
tive approaches.
We present models of finite markets and 
limiting results for large markets. In all of 
these models frictions take center stage, even 
when the set of agents is large. In particular, 
some sellers can have few customers, while 
others have more than they need,  leading 
to rationing, unsold inventories, the coex-
istence of vacancies and unemployment, 
etc. The theory captures a powerful idea: if 
you post more favorable terms, customers 
may come to you with a higher probability, 
but not necessarily with probability  1 . If 
a restaurant only has a certain number of 
tables, or a firm only wants to hire a certain 
number of workers, it may not be smart to 
go where everyone else is going. These kinds 
of capacity constraints play a major role in 
the models surveyed below, and mean that 
agents must consider both the terms of 
trade and the probability of trade. Of course 
capacity also matters in GE theory, but only 
at the market level—one cannot ask about 
the capacity of an agent’s trading partner, 
because the agents trade with the market 
and not with each other.
The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 starts with static models, one 
framed in terms of goods and one in terms 
of labor markets. Section 3 embeds these in 
dynamic GE to discuss the time to execute 
trades (e.g., how long an unemployed worker 
or unsold house remains on the market) as 
well as endogenous price dispersion and 
stickiness. Section 4 presents applications 
in monetary economics, where the frame-
work provides a very natural approach. 
While sections 2–4 use large numbers of 
agents, section 5 analyzes finite markets and 
then takes limits as the market gets large. 
Section 6 studies heterogeneity and sort-
ing. Sections 7 and 8 consider private infor-
mation and mechanism design. Sections 9 
and 10 mention other topics and conclude. 
In general, applications that do not pique 
a reader’s interest can be skipped without 
loss of continuity. As a rule of thumb, foot-
notes contain optional material (e.g., addi-
tional citations or technical details) and can 
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also be skipped without loss of continuity. 
Appendices, as usual, can be skipped, too, 
but they contain some new or hard-to-find 
technical material that is potentially useful.4
2. Benchmark Models
2.1 Goods Markets
Consider a market with large num-
bers of two types of agents, called buyers 
and sellers, with measures  N b and  N s , and 
let  N =  N b / N s denote the population 
buyer/seller ratio. One can think of buyers 
as households or consumers and sellers as 
retailers, but other interpretations are pos-
sible  (e.g., producers buying inputs from 
suppliers). There are two tradable objects. 
There is an indivisible good  q , and sellers 
can produce exactly one unit at cost  c ≥ 0 , 
while buyers want to consume exactly one 
unit for utility  u > c; and there is a divisible 
good  x that anyone can produce at cost  C (x) 
= x and consume for utility  U (x) = x . The 
idea is that there are gains from trade in  q , 
while  x serves as a payment instrument that 
buyers use to compensate sellers. This can 
be interpreted as direct barter, although 
more typically in the literature it is called 
transferable utility.5
For now each seller simply posts a price  p , 
the amount of  x buyers must pay to get  q . 
Each buyer directs his search after observing 
all posted prices (all we actually need is that 
4 While there is no previous survey on directed search, 
some surveys on labor, money, housing, and industrial 
organization (IO)  touch on it, for example, King (2003); 
Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005); Shi (2008); Han 
and Strange (2015); Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright (2017); 
and Armstrong (2017). We try to provide an integrated 
framework.
5 Sometimes  x is called money or numeraire, but that 
is very bad language. It should be obvious that it is not 
really money (below we discuss genuine money). It is also 
not numeraire, which is the good with price set to  1 in the 
Walrasian budget equation, because there is no budget 
equation in this model (below we consider models with 
genuine numeraire goods).
each buyer observes at least two prices; see 
Acemoglu and Autor 2016, theorem 13.4). 
Suppose traders meet pairwise. Thus, if a 
set of buyers with measure  n b direct their 
search toward a set of sellers with measure 
 n s , the probability a seller meets a buyer is 
 α s = α (n) , where  n =  n b / n s is the buyer/
seller ratio, also called the queue length or 
market tightness. Similarly, the probability 
a buyer meets a seller is  α b = α (n) / n . It is 
standard to assume  α s = α (n) is increasing 
and concave, which implies  α b = α (n) / n 
is decreasing, given the natural restric-
tion  α (0) = 0 . In static or discrete-time 
models  α b and  α s are probabilities, so 
we impose  0 ≤  α j ≤ 1 ; in continuous- 
time they are arrival rates, so we 
only impose  α j ≥ 0 . We also usually 
assume differentiability, and sometimes 
 lim n→0  α ′ (n) = ∞ .
To understand this, imagine any two-
sided market with  n 1 and  n 2 agents on 
each side, where the number of bilat-
eral meetings between types  1 and  2 is 
 μ = μ ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) . Analogous to a production 
function mapping inputs into output,  μ is 
assumed to be increasing and concave, and 
usually to display constant returns to scale 
(CRS). Then  α 1 = μ ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) / n 1 = μ (n, 1) / n , 
where  n =  n 1 / n 2 , and  α 2 = μ ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) / n 2 
= μ (n, 1) . This generalizes models of one-
sided markets (e.g., Diamond 1982), and 
is more interesting because the  α terms 
depend on tightness, even with CRS. In 
addition, with a two-sided specification it is 
natural to endogenize tightness by allowing 
entry by one side. For now, a buyer seeks 
a seller with a particular  p , but whether he 
finds one is random (in section 5 an agent 
finds a counterparty for sure, but may or may 
not trade, due to capacity constraints).
A set of sellers posting the same  p and 
buyers searching for them constitutes a 
 submarket with tightness  n =  n b / n s . Thus, 
a submarket is characterized by  (p, n) . 
Buyers’ and sellers’ payoffs are denoted  V b 
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and  V s . Sellers maximize  V s by posting  (p, n) , 
although it is not crucial that they post  n —
sellers can equivalently post only  p and let 
buyers work out the equilibrium  n for them-
selves. In any case, for a seller to be in busi-
ness,  (p, n) must deliver to buyers their 
market payoff  V b , which is an equilibrium 
object, but taken as given by individuals. 
This is called the market utility approach.6
Then sellers solve the following problem:
(1)  V s =  max p,n α (n) (p − c) 
subject to
   
α (n)  _n (u − p) =  V b . 
Sellers’ payoff in a submarket is their trading 
probability times the surplus  S s = p − c , 
and buyers’ payoff is their trading probabil-
ity times the surplus  S b = u − p . While a 
more rigorous definition of competitive 
search equilibrium appears in section 6, 
the idea is basically optimization and mar-
ket clearing:  sellers maximize  V s subject to 
buyers getting  V b ; and the  n emerging from 
(1) is consistent with the set of buyers and 
sellers in the market. Notice sellers can get 
the same  V s from lower  p if  n is higher, and 
buyers can get the same  V b from higher  p if  n 
is lower. These trade-offs are a quintessential 
element of the theory.
To solve (1), use the constraint to elimi-
nate  p in the objective function:
(2)  V s =  max n {α (n) (u − c) − n V b } . 
6 Early use of this approach includes, for example, 
Montgomery (1991), McAfee (1993), Shimer (1996), 
and Moen (1997); Peters (2000), based on Peters (1991), 
derives it from microfoundations, as do Julien, Kennes, 
and King (2000) and Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), as 
discussed in section 5.
This problem has a unique solution.7 If it 
is interior it satisfies the FOC   α ′ (n) (u − c) 
=  V b . Then, given  n , the constraint yields  p 
uniquely, so any active submarkets must have 
the same  (p, n) . Hence, given CRS, we only 
need one submarket.
There are two standard ways to pro-
ceed. The first is to assume  N b and  N s are 
fixed. Then the equilibrium buyer–seller 
ratio must be the same as the popula-
tion ratio,  n = N (market clearing). The 
FOC  then implies  V b =  α ′ (N) (u − c) , and 
the constraint implies  p = u − N V b / α (N) , 
or
(3)  p = εc +  (1 − ε) u, 
where  ε = ε (n) ≡ n α ′ (n) / α (n) is the elas-
ticity of  α (n) with respect to tightness. Hence, 
price is a weighted average of cost and utility 
that splits the ex post (after meeting) surplus 
 S = u − c according to  S b = ε (u − c) and 
 S s =  (1 − ε) (u − c) . The ex ante (before 
meeting) payoffs can now be written 
 V b =   α b ε (u − c) and  V s =  α s (1 − ε) (u − c) . 
This uniquely pins down the equilib-
rium  ⟨ p, n,  V b ,  V s ⟩ .
The second way to proceed is to assume 
one side has a cost to participate, and there-
fore, in general, only some of them enter 
the market. Suppose it is sellers that have a 
participation cost  k s . Then in equilibrium, as 
long as  k s is neither too big nor too small rel-
ative to  N s , some but not all sellers enter, and 
we have the free entry condition  V s =  k s . As 
above, the FOC  implies  V b =  α ′ (n) (u − c) 
and the constraint implies  p = εc +  (1 − ε) u . 
Now  k s =  V s = α (n) (p − c) , from which 
7 Appendix A proves this in a generalized version with-
out transferable utility:  if a buyer makes payment  p to a 
seller, the latter gets  ν (p) while former gets  − γ (p) ; in the 
text here  ν (p) = γ (p) = p . In fact, what is shown is that 
the second-order conditions (SOCs) hold at any solution to 
the first-order conditions (FOCs), so if there is an interior 
solution it is unique, but one should also check for corner 
solutions.
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we get  n . Once again these conditions 
uniquely pin down  ⟨ p, n,  V b ,  V s ⟩ .
Figure 1, a version of which appears in 
Peters (1991), shows the “Edgeworth box” in 
(p, n) space. Indifference curves for buyers 
slope down, because they are willing to pay 
higher  p if  n is lower, so they can trade faster. 
Similarly, sellers are willing to accept lower  p 
if  n is higher. As in elementary microeco-
nomics, efficient outcomes are points of 
tangency, tracing out the contract curve . 
The left panel depicts the case without entry, 
where  crosses  n = N ; the right depicts the 
case with entry by sellers, where  crosses 
the indifference curve  V s = k .
For comparison, consider this problem:
(4)  V b =  max p,n  
α (n)  _n (u − p)  
subject to
 α (n) (p − c) =  V s , 
where it looks like buyers post and sellers 
search. It yields the same  ⟨ p, n,  V b ,  V s ⟩ as 
(1), with  n fixed or with entry. One can also 
consider a third version, with third parties, 
called market makers, designing submar-
kets by posting  (p, n) to attract buyers and 
sellers (see Moen 1997 and Mortensen and 
Wright 2002 for more discussion). Again 
the outcome is the same. Hence, it does 
not matter if buyers, sellers, or market mak-
ers post here (this is not always true; see 
below).
Figure 2 describes competitive search 
equilibrium by depicting the solution to 
(4) as a “demand”  for sellers  N s as a func-
tion of the “cost”   V s (given  N b , choos-
ing  n is the same as  N s ). One can check 
“demand” is decreasing and, as shown, hits  0 
at finite  V s . Without entry, in the left panel 
“supply”  is vertical and equilibrium deter-
mines  V s . With entry by sellers, in the right 
panel “supply”  is horizontal at  k s and equi-
librium determines  N s . Indeed, one could 
nest these with a general upward-sloping 
“supply”  curve by letting  k s vary with the 
number of homogeneous entrants, or across 










V*s  =  ks

Figure 1. Equilibrium without (left) and with (right) Entry by Sellers
Source: Based on Peters (1991).
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of figure 2, like figure 1, is that the theory can 
be described using tools from elementary 
microeconomics.
Now consider a planner’s problem with 
endogenous participation by sellers,
(5)  max 
n
 { 
α (n)  _n (u − c) −  
 k s  _n } . 
The first term is the expected surplus per 
buyer; the second is the entry cost of sellers 
per buyer, since  n s / n b = 1 / n . If we elim-
inate  p from the objective function in (4) 
using the constraint, this is the same as (5) 
with  V s =  k s . Equilibrium is efficient.
For yet another comparison, consider 
bargaining instead of posting.8 Thus, after a 
8 The easiest interpretation is that there is no commu-
nication outside of meetings, so agents cannot post terms 
to attract counterparties. Another is that agents cannot 
commit to what they post, although that need not mean it 
is irrelevant (Menzio 2007; Doyle and Wong 2013; Dutu 
2013; Kim and Kircher 2015; Stacey 2016, 2019).
buyer and seller meet, they determine  p by 
generalized Nash bargaining,
(6)  max 
p
  (u − p) θ  (p − c) 1−θ , 
where  θ is buyer bargaining power. The solu-
tion is  p = θc +  (1 − θ) u , which is the same 
as  p under posting, and hence efficient, if and 
only if  θ = ε . This is the well-known Hosios 
(1990) condition: efficiency obtains if and 
only if agents’ bargaining powers are equal 
to the elasticity of the meeting technology 
with respect to their participation.9 Hence, 
sellers should get a share of  u − c commen-
surate with their contribution to matching. 
9 Earlier discussions of efficiency in related models 
include Mortensen (1982a, b) and Pissarides, Layard, and 
Hellwig (1986). More recently, Mangin and Julien (2021) 
show this: with one-side heterogeneity, on the side search-
ing, several environments generate an expected trade sur-
plus that endogenously depends on tightness; they derive 
a generalized Hosios condition that implements (usually) 
efficiency by trading off the probability of trade with not 















Figure 2. Equilibrium without (left) and with (right) Entry by Sellers
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Since this is exactly what competitive search 
delivers, it is often said that it induces the 
Hosios condition endogenously.
If  n = N is fixed, one can 
check  ∂ V s / ∂ N > 0 and  ∂ V b / ∂ N < 0 , 
while  ∂ p / ∂ N ≈ − ε ′ where “ a ≈ b ” means 
“ a and  b have the same sign.”  Now 
ε ′ < 0 , and hence  ∂ p / ∂ N > 0 , for many 
common meeting technologies, but not 
all.10 Does  ∂ p / ∂ N < 0 make sense?  Yes. 
First note that higher  N always increases 
 V s and decreases  V b , where these can change 
due to either changes in  p or in the trad-
ing probabilities. By construction  α (N) 
goes up and  α (N) / N down with  N , but 
if they move a lot,  p must go down so the 
changes in  V s and  V b are not too big. Hence 
an increase in demand along the extensive 
margin (higher  n ) can lower  p , although 
one can show an increase along the inten-
sive margin (higher  u ) implies  ∂ p/∂ u > 0 
unambiguously. Similarly, with seller entry, 
higher  k s reduces  N s and raises  n , also imply-
ing  ∂ p/∂ k s ≈ − ε ′ and  ∂ p / ∂ u > 0 . That  p 
might fall when the buyer–seller ratio rises 
reflects the idea that resource allocation is 
guided by both prices and probabilities.
2.2 Labor Markets
Now let households be sellers of their 
time,  and firms buyers. Each firm wants to 
hire exactly one worker, while each house-
hold wants to land one job. Thus,  n is the 
vacancy–unemployment ratio. Again, it does 
not matter here who posts and who searches. 
Consider a version of (1) that maximizes 
workers’ payoffs,
(7)  V s =  max w,n α (n) (w − b)  
10 Appendix E shows  ε ′ (n) ≷ 0 ⇔ σ (n) ≷ 1 , where 
 σ (n) is the elasticity of substitution. Consider a con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology,  μ 
( n 1 ,  n 2 ) =  ( n 1 γ +  n 2 γ) 1/γ ,  γ ∈  (− ∞, 1) , where  σ = 1 / 
(1 − γ) . Then  γ > 0 ⇒  ε ′ > 0 ,  γ < 0 ⇒  ε ′ < 0 , and, in the 
Cobb–Douglas case,  γ = 0 ⇒  ε ′ = 0 . The point is that it is 
not hard to get  ε ′ > 0 in examples.
subject to
  
α (n)  _n (y − w) =  V b , 
where  y is output per worker and  b is the 
value of unemployment benefits, leisure, and 
home production sacrificed by taking a job. 
Here  y ,  b , and  w play the roles of  u ,  c , and  p 
in the goods market.
Emulating subsection 2.1, with  n = N 
fixed, we get  w = εb +  (1 − ε) y ,  V s =  α s 
(1 − ε) (y − b) , and  V b =  α b ε (y − b) . And 
with entry by buyers (the firms in this appli-
cation), we get a similar outcome except  n 
is endogenous and  V b =  k b . With  n = N 
fixed we have  ∂ w / ∂ N ≈ − ε ′ , and with 
entry we have  ∂ n / ∂ k b < 0 and  ∂ w / ∂ k b 
≈  ε ′ . If  ε ′ < 0 then  w goes up with tight-
ness, as one might expect, but that is not true 
in general, as explained above for goods mar-
kets. As other features of goods markets also 
carry over, we proceed to applications.
Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006); 
Galenianos and Kircher (2009); and Kircher 
(2009) let workers apply for more than one 
job.11 If workers can apply to  v ∈  {1, 2, …} 
vacancies, then it turns out there will be  v 
distinct wages posted, and the optimal search 
strategy is to apply to one of each—that is, 
to look for work simultaneously in  v dis-
tinct submarkets. Hence, the model exhibits 
wage dispersion with homogeneous agents, 
as is relevant because a large part of empir-
ical wage variation cannot be explained by 
observables (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 
1999; Mortensen 2003). Also, consistent with 
the evidence, the density of posted wages 
can be shown to be decreasing, while by way 
of contrast, in models based on Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998) with homogeneous agents, 
11 One difference is: in Albrecht, Gautier, and 
Vroman (2006), if two or more firms make offers to the 
same worker they compete à la Bertrand (see also Albrecht, 
Gautier, and Vroman 2003; Albrecht et al. 2004); as in 
Galenianos and Kircher (2009) or Kircher (2009),  here 
firms commit to posted wages.
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the density is increasing. Also, again consis-
tent with conventional wisdom, firms offering 
higher wages receive more applications.
Allowing multiple applications introduces 
an element of portfolio choice for work-
ers, with low-wage applications serving to 
reduce the downside risk. This embeds in 
an equilibrium setting a version of Chade 
and Smith’s (2006) marginal improvement 
algorithm. For a simplified exposition, 
consider  v = 2 , so there are two wages 
posted,  w 1 and  w 2 ≥  w 1 , with workers 
sending applications to two distinct submar-
kets. If both pan out, they accept the highest 
wage; if only one pans out, they take it. Their 
expected payoff is therefore
(8)  V s =  max  w 1 , w 2 {α ( n 2 ) ( w 2 − b) 
+  [1 − α ( n 2 ) ] α ( n 1 ) ( w 1 − b) } , 
where  n j is the tightness in a submarket post-
ing  w j .
Generalizing the above methods, in the 
low-wage submarket, we solve
(9)  V s1 =  max  n 1 , w 1 α ( n 1 ) ( w 1 − b)  
subject to
   
 [1 − π ( w 1 ) ] α ( n 1 )   _______________ n 1  (y −  w 1 ) =  V b 
where  π (w) is the probability a worker 
rejects  w 1 if offered. Given a solution to (9), 
substitute  V s1 into (8) to obtain the problem 
for the high-wage submarket
(10)  V s =  max  n 2 , w 2 {α ( n 2 ) ( w 2 − b −  V s1 ) +  V s1 }  
subject to
   
α ( n 2 )  _ n 2  (y −  w 2 ) =  V b . 
This looks like a problem with  v = 1 , but 
now the outside option is  b +  V s1 , not just  b . 
Since a higher outside option raises the posted 
wage, this is consistent with  w 2 >  w 1 . Thus 
we support  2 posted wages.
For efficiency, in Galenianos and 
Kircher (2009), a worker who gets a high 
wage still enters the queue at low wages. 
With  v = 2 , if a fraction  ρ of firms post  w 1 
then  n 1 = ρ  n b / n s ,  n 2 =  (1 − ρ)  n b / n s , and 
 π ( w 1 ) = α ( n 2 ) . To characterize equilib-
rium, solve (9) and (10) with  ρ set so that  V b 
is the same in the two submarkets. The out-
come is inefficient. Since workers obtaining 
jobs at  w 2 still enter the queue at  w 1 , they 
can prevent others from getting  w 2 . Neither 
the firms posting high wages nor the  workers 
who obtain them take this into account, 
implying an unpriced externality. In Kircher 
(2009), workers who obtain  w 2 no longer 
queue for  w 1 . This implies  π ( w 1 ) = 0 since 
any worker in the low-wage queue does 
not have a high-wage offer. This achieves 
efficiency since the unpriced externality 
disappears.12
2.3 Summary of Baseline Models
Table 1 provides comparative statics for 
goods and labor markets in the benchmark 
model, where agents can only search in one 
submarket, for three cases:  (i)  fixed popu-
lations, (ii) entry by sellers, and (iii)  entry 
by buyers. Most results are unambiguous, 
except as explained above, some of the 
effects on  p or  w can go either way. A few 
cases report  + ∗ or  − ∗ to indicate that the 
12 As a referee said, it is not clear how to compare the 
results because one can say the environment is different 
if workers who obtain  w 2 no longer queue for  w 1 . In any 
case, the main point here is to say that efficiency models 
depend on details. Wolthoff (2018) constructs a model 
encompassing Kircher (2009) and Galenianos and Kircher 
(2009), endogenizes firms’ recruitment efforts, and con-
cludes that multiple submarkets are crucial for matching 
the data. Gautier and Holzner (2016) introduce a more 
sophisticated process to bid for workers after matching, so 
no vacancies remain idle because workers reject them to 
join firms with more applicants than they need, and that 
leads to efficiency. All this work constitutes progress, but 
there is still room for more.
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signs are ambiguous, in general, but  + or  − 
in the common case  ε ′ ≤ 0 .
The analogous table for bargaining is simi-
lar, except effects reported as  ε ′ or  − ε ′ would 
be  0 , and those reported as  + ∗ and  − ∗ would 
be  + and  − . The models above have those 
results in the special case of a Cobb–Douglas 
meeting technology, where  ε ′ = 0 , but in 
general, parameters that affect  ε can move 
trading probabilities enough to move prices 
in ways that are counterintuitive without 
understanding the theory. Under bargain-
ing the terms of trade do not change with  n , 
because while arrival rates affect expected 
payoffs, they do not affect the surpluses after 
traders meet, and hence are irrelevant in the 
negotiations. Now in dynamic models, as dis-
cussed below,  n can affect continuation val-
ues and hence the bargaining outcome, but in 
competitive search  equilibrium  n affects the 
terms of trade even in a static  environment. 
In any case, we highlight the following 
results.13
PROPOSITION 1: In the benchmark model 
with homogeneous agents that can search 
in at most one submarket, with or without 
entry, there is a unique equilibrium and it has 
a single price or wage. This is efficient. When 
agents can simultaneously search in  v > 1 
submarkets, there is a unique equilibrium 
and it has  v prices or wages. This is efficient 
if there are no unpriced externalities.
13 As a referee pointed out, some of our propositions are 
really just summaries of discussions in the text. Others are 
more rigorous and have nontrivial proofs. At the risk of 
appearing pretentious, we label them all as propositions, 
mainly to maintain symmetry in the way we highlight key 
aspects of the presentation.
TABLE 1.1 
Goods Market
Panel A. n = N fixed
n p  V b  V s  S b  S s 
N + −ε′ − + ε′ −ε′
u 0 + + + + +
c 0 + − − − −
Panel B. Entry by sellers (firms)
n p  V b  V s  S b  S s 
 k s + −ε′ − + ε′ −ε′
u − + + 0 +* +
c + +* − 0 −* −
Panel C. Entry by buyers (households)
n p  V b  V s  S b  S s 
 k b − ε′ + − −ε′ ε′
u + +* 0 + + +*
c − + 0 − −ε′ −*
TABLE 1.2 
Labor Market
Panel A. n = N fixed
n w  V b  V s  S b  S s 
N + −ε′ − + ε′ −ε′
y 0 + + + + +
b 0 + − − − −
Panel B. Entry by sellers (households)
n w  V b  V s  S b  S s 
 k s + −ε′ − + ε′ −ε′
y − + + 0 +* +
b + +* − 0 −* −
Panel C. Entry by buyers (firms)
n w  V b  V s  S b  S s 
 k b − ε′ + − −ε′ ε′
y + +* 0 + + +*
b − + 0 − −ε′ −*
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3. Extensions and Applications
It is desirable to consider dynamics mod-
els, where meeting probabilities translate 
into random durations between trades. For 
goods markets, we can simply repeat the 
static version, and since that is easy we add 
a few other features. Simply repeating a 
static model is less natural for labor, so we 
incorporate long-term relationships.
3.1 Goods Markets
We now embed the markets studied 
above into dynamic GE using the structure 
in Lagos and Wright (2005). Each period in 
discrete time, agents interact in two ways: in 
a decentralized market (DM) like the one 
analyzed above, and then in a frictionless 
centralized market (CM).14 Continue to 
let  V b and  V s be the DM value functions, and 
now let  W b and  W s be the CM value func-
tions. In the CM, buyers solve 
(11)  W b (d) =  max x,ℓ {U (x) − ℓ + β  V b }  
subject to 
x = wℓ − d, 
where  β is the discount factor,  x is 
CM  numeraire,  ℓ is labor,  w is the wage, 
14 There are several appealing aspects to this alternat-
ing CM–DM structure: First, we can dispense with buyers 
paying in the DM using transferable utility and have them 
pay in terms of numeraire in the next CM (and there is a 
genuine numeraire here, in contrast to the situation in foot-
note  5). Also, we can make credit imperfect to analyze debt 
limits and money in serious ways. Also, precisely for these 
reasons, this is now the workhorse model in monetary the-
ory, and we want to use it in 4.2. Moreover, it is a tractable 
way to integrate search into general equilibrium, which lets 
one add markets for capital, other assets, etc. In fact, adding 
the CM actually simplifies rather dramatically the analysis 
of models with only DM trade. But it is not just a way to 
simplify things, it is realistic: some aspects of one’s actual 
economic life are well modeled by frictionless or central-
ized trade, others seem better captured by search or decen-
tralized trade, and it seems good to have a setup with some 
of each. See Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright (2017) for more.
and  d is debt from the previous DM.15 To 
ease notation, assume  x is produced one for 
one with  ℓ , so that in equilibrium  w = 1 . 
Then the solution to (11) has  x =  x ∗ where 
U ′ ( x ∗ ) = 1 . Also, the envelope condition 
is  W b ′(d) = − 1 . The CM problem for sellers 
is omitted, but similar.
Since buyers acquire debt  d = p in 
DM trade, we have
(12)  V b =  α b [u +  W b (p) ] +  (1 −  α b )  W b (0) 
 =  α b (u − p) +  W b (0) 
because  W b (p) −  W b (0) = − p , by the 
envelope condition. Similarly, for sellers,
(13)  V s =  α s (p − c) +  W s (0) . 
Except for  W b (0) and  W s (0) , notice  V b and  V s 
are identical to the static model. Hence, mak-
ing the benchmark dynamic in this way is 
easy, but still nice, since higher  α (n) now 
means sellers trade faster, mapping neatly 
into the realm of duration analysis as used 
in much empirical work (e.g., Devine and 
Kiefer 1991). In particular, the expected 
times for sellers and buyers to transact 
are  1 / α (n) and  n / α (n) .
While heterogeneity is covered more fully 
in section 6, it is worth seeing some exam-
ples here. Consider two types of buyers with 
utilities  u 1 and  u 2 >  u 1 , and entry by homo-
geneous sellers. Then the market segments 
into two distinct submarkets,  j = 1, 2 , where 
( p j ,  n j ) is determined by
(14)  k s =  [α ( n j ) −  n j α ′ ( n j ) ] ( u j − c)  
and
    p j = c +  k s / α ( n j ) . 
15 One-period debt is without loss of generality, given 
quasi-linear CM utility, although we can generalize to any 
utility function satisfying  U 11  U 22 =  U 12 2 (see Wong 2016).
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Notice that (14)  holds for  j = 1, 2 inde-
pendently, a feature called block recursivity. 
It lets us first solve for  n j in each submarket  j 
(block 1) regardless of what is happening in 
other submarkets; then the number of agents 
in each submarket is determined (block 2) so 
the total number of buyers sums to the num-
ber in the economy, and free entry of sell-
ers ensures that market tightness is correct 
(more on this below).
Given  u 2 >  u 1 , one can check  n 2 <  n 1 
and  p 2 >  p 1 . Thus, high-valuation buyers go 
to submarket  2 , where they pay more but 
trade faster. Sellers trade slower in submar-
ket  2 and, in equilibrium, they are indif-
ferent between it and submarket  1 . This 
is shown in the left panel of figure 3, with 
 buyers in submarkets  1 and  2 on indifference 
curves denoted  V 1 ∗ and  V 2 ∗, both of which are 
tangent to the sellers’ common indifference 
curve  V s ∗ =  k s .
Now consider homogeneous buyers and 
two seller types in fixed numbers  N 1 and  N 2 , 
with  c 1 and  c 2 >  c 1 but the same  k  (Julien, 
Kennes, and King 2006a consider differ-
ent  k ). Suppose  c j is not too big, so all  sellers 
participate. As shown in the right panel of 
figure 3, the market segments into two sub-
markets where now buyers are indifferent 
between them. As usual,  ( p j ,  n j ) is deter-
mined by
 α ′ ( n j ) (u −  c j ) =  V b  
and
   p j = ε ( n j )  c j +  [1 − ε ( n j ) ] u. 
Let us normalize  N b = 1 and let  ξ be the 
fraction of buyers in submarket  1 . Then 
buyer indifference uniquely determines  ξ by
 α ′ ( 
ξ _ 
 N 1 )
 (u −  c 1 ) =  α ′ ( 
1 − ξ _
 N 2 
 ) (u −  c 2 ) . 
One can check  n 2 <  n 1 and  p 2 >  p 1 , 
so sellers in submarket  2 trade slower, while 
buyers trade faster but pay higher prices.
Clearly the theory accommodates devi-
ations from the law  of one price. With 
heterogeneous buyers, sellers in submar-
ket  1 settle for  p 1 , even though others are 


















  = ks*
Figure 3. Heterogeneous Buyers (left) or Sellers (right)
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longer to sell. With heterogeneous sellers, 
 buyers in submarket  2 pay  p 2 even though 
others are paying  p 1 <  p 2 , for similar rea-
sons. This is related to, yet different from, 
other theories of price dispersion. In Burdett 
and Judd (1983), for instance, buyers see a 
random number of prices simultaneously—
called noisy search—and when they see 
more than one they pick the lowest. In equi-
librium ex ante identical sellers post differ-
ent prices but earn equal profits, as those 
with lower  p earn less per unit but make it 
up on the volume. That is like our sellers, but 
Burdett–Judd buyers do not make a directed 
choice between paying less or trading faster 
the way they do here.
Returning to heterogeneous buyers and 
homogeneous sellers, consider the appli-
cation to housing in Rekkas, Wright, and 
Zhu (2017). There are a fixed number of 
homogeneous houses in the market, but 
buyers are heterogeneous, with  the value 
to becoming a homeowner distributed con-
tinuously across buyers with cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF)   G (u) and support 
[ u 1 ,  u 2 ] . Now equilibrium involves a con-
tinuum of submarkets indexed by  ( p u ,  n u ) 
(this is treated more formally below). Hence 
there is a submarket for every point on sell-
ers’ common indifference curve between 
( n 1 ∗,  p 1 ∗) and  ( n 2 ∗,  p 2 ∗) , with higher  u associ-
ated with higher  p u and lower  n u . Higher-
valuation buyers search where their trading 
probabilities and prices are higher, while sell-
ers are indifferent because listing a house at a 
higher price means a longer average time on 
the market. Of course, it is no surprise that a 
big home in a nice neighborhood costs more 
than a small one in a bad neighborhood; the 
interest here is in residual price dispersion, 
the way labor economists are interested in 
residual wage dispersion.
What may be less obvious is that the 
model is consistent with sticky prices. If 
market conditions change, the distribution 
reacts, but if the change is not too big the old 
and new  supports overlap, and sellers with  p 
in the overlapping range have no incentive 
to reprice. If demand falls, for example, the 
 distribution shifts left, but many sellers can 
keep the same  p . This is relevant because 
people claim house prices are sticky in the 
data and find it puzzling: “conventional wis-
dom is that traditional, rational, forward-look-
ing economic theories are unable to explain 
extreme price stickiness of this sort, unless 
there are large menu costs” (Merlo, Ortalo-
Magné, and Rust 2015). More generally, 
directed search is natural for understanding 
many aspects of housing markets.16
Moving from houses back to generic goods, 
let us now make them divisible: DM buyers 
get a quantity  or quality  q in exchange for 
payment  p in the next CM. Buyers’ utility 
and sellers’ cost,  u (q) and  c (q) , satisfy the 
usual properties, plus  u (0) = c (0) = 0 
and  u ( q ¯ ) = c ( q ¯ ) for some  q ¯ > 0 . The effi-
cient  q solves  u ′ ( q ∗ ) =  c ′ ( q ∗ ) . One can call 
p ˆ = p / q the unit price, unless  q is unob-
served quality, in which case one might still 
call  p the price. We assume both  p and  q are 
posted, although there are alternatives—, 
perhaps due to limited commitment, there 
may be a posted unit price  p ˆ , and then in 
a meeting  q is chosen unilaterally by the 
buyer (Peters 1984) or the seller (Gomis-
Porqueras, Julien, and Wang 2017).
16 In Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2016), sellers 
first list prices, with more attractive prices meaning more 
buyers show up on average (although the actual number is 
random, as in section 5). Each buyer can accept the listed 
price or make a counteroffer. If no buyers accept, the seller 
can accept or reject the best counteroffer. If exactly  one 
buyer accepts, he gets the house at the listed price. If  two 
or more accept, the seller runs an auction. This is consis-
tent with data showing that houses can sell at, above, or 
below listed prices. In other applications, Diaz and Jerez 
(2013) build a model consistent with cyclical data. Head, 
Sun, and Zhou (2016) have heterogenous sellers, and 
highly  indebted homeowners tend to list high prices and 
take longer to sell. Hedlund (2016) has heterogenous buy-
ers and sellers and accounts for cyclical dynamics. See also 
Garriga and Hedlund (2016); Stacey (2016); Moen, Nenov, 
and Sniekers (2019); and Head, Lloyd-Ellis, and Stacey 
(2017).
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We also introduce a limit on how much one 
can promise to pay,  p ≤ L , a debt/liquid-
ity constraint that is exogenous for now, but 
endogenized in section 4. If it is slack then, 
ignoring the constants  W b (0) and  W s (0) , we 
have
(15)  V b =  max p,q,n  
α (n)  _n [u (q) − p]  
subject to
 α (n) [p − c (q) ] =  V s . 
Indeed, when  p ≤ L is slack, the solution 
has  q =  q ∗ , so the problem is basically 
the same as the one with a fixed  q , and the 
usual procedure yields  ( n ∗ ,   p ∗ ) . The gen-
eralization of (3) is  p ∗ = ε ( n ∗ ) c ( q ∗ ) + 
 [1 − ε ( n ∗ ) ] u ( q ∗ ) , and the constraint is 
indeed slack if and only if  L ≥  p ∗ .
When  L <  p ∗ , so the constraint binds, 
the results are quite different. In appendix A 
we solve (15) and show the SOCs hold at any 
solution to the FOCs, so there is a unique 
interior solution, and it implies  L = g (q, n) 
where
(16)  g (q, n) 
≡  
ε (n) u ′ (q) c (q) +  [1 − ε (n) ] c ′ (q) u (q)    ______________________________  
ε (n) u ′ (q) +  [1 − ε (n) ] c ′ (q) 
 . 
This condition appears in many models 
with liquidity considerations and Nash bar-
gaining (see section 4), except  ε (n) replaces 
buyers’ bargaining share  θ . More compli-
cated versions of this setup are studied by 
Rocheteau and Wright (2005), Menzio, Shi, 
and Sun (2013), and Choi (2015). We again 
highlight the main results as follows:
PROPOSITION 2: Dynamic models with 
credit yield results analogous to static models 
with transferable utility, with  q endogenous 
and  p fixed, or vice versa. Heterogeneity seg-
ments submarkets by probability and price. 
Price stickiness emerges as follows:  when 
market conditions change, some prices can 
stay the same, as endogenous trading prob-
abilities make some agents indifferent to 
changing posted terms. 
3.2 Labor Markets
While enduring relationships may be 
relevant in goods markets—one may have 
a favorite shop or bar—in labor markets 
they are ubiquitous. We now work through 
Moen (1997), a directed search version of 
Pissarides (2000), where market tightness is 
 n = v / (1 − e) , the measure of vacancies 
over unemployment, and  e is the employ-
ment rate with a population of households 
normalized to  1 .
Here we use continuous time.17 Then let-
ting  V b1 and  V b0 be firms’ payoffs to having a 
worker and an open vacancy, in steady state 
we have
(17)  r  V b0 = − k +  
α (n)  _n ( V b1 −  V b0 ) ,
(18)  r  V b1 = y − w + δ ( V b0 −  V b1 ) , 
where  k is the cost of a vacancy,  r the dis-
count rate, and  δ the job destruction rate 
(which is exogenous, but can be endoge-
nized as in Mortensen and Pissarides 1994). 
In words, for example, (17) says the flow pay-
off to a vacancy is  − k plus the arrival rate of 
workers,  α (n) / n , times the gain to filling the 
position,  V b1 −  V b0 . Similarly, for households
(19)  r  V s0 = b + α (n) ( V s1 −  V s0 ) , 
(20)  r  V s1 = w + δ ( V s0 −  V s1 ) . 
Again it does not matter for results if firms 
or workers post, but the latter is easier, 
17 There is no CM in this environment, but it can be 
interesting to add one  (Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright 
2011; Gomis-Porqueras, Julien, and Wang 2013; Zhang 
and Huangfu 2018; Dong and Xiao 2014).
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since  V b0 = 0 (free entry). This  and (17)–
(18) yield the wage
(21)  w = y − k (r + δ) n / α (n) . 
We can solve (19)–(20) for  V s0 . Then, insert-
ing  w from (21), we get the problem
 r  V s0 = b +  max n  
α (n) (y − b) − n (r + δ) k  ____________________ 
r + δ + α (n) 
 . 
The FOC implies  T (n) = 0 , where
(22)  T (n) ≡  α ′ (n) (y − b) 
 −  [r + δ + α (n) − n α ′ (n) ] k, 
and one can check  T (0) > 0 > T (∞) and 
 T ′ (n) < 0 .
So there is a unique solution to  T (n) = 0 , 
and hence a unique equilibrium  n . One can 
derive
(23)  ∂ n _∂ y > 0,   
∂ n _∂ b < 0,   
∂ n _∂ k < 0,
    ∂ n _∂ δ < 0, and  
∂ n _∂ r < 0. 
The effects of  y ,  b , and  k are consistent with 
table 1.2(c), plus there are new effects of  δ 
and  r , and all accord well with intuition. One 
can also show  ∂ w / ∂ b > 0 ,  ∂ w / ∂ δ < 0, 
and  ∂ w / ∂ r < 0 , plus  ∂ w / ∂ y > 0 
and  ∂ w / ∂ k < 0 if  ε ′ ≤ 0 .
Appendix B shows the equilibrium out-
come is the same as the solution to a plan-
ner’s problem posed without restricting 
attention to steady state—that is, the effi-
cient  n solves  T (n) = 0 at every date, as in 
Pissarides (2000). This is again block recur-
sivity, where  the measure of vacancies  v 
depends on  e , but tightness  n = v / (1 − e) 
does not. Rearranging  T (n) = 0 , we get
(24)  k =  
α (n)  _n  
ε (n) (y − b)   ___________________  
r + δ + α (n) [1 − ε (n) ] 
, 
which equates firms’ vacancy cost to their 
arrival rate times their share,  ε (n) , of the 
appropriately discounted surplus  y − b . 
This is the same as Pissarides (2000), except 
the elasticity  ε replaces firms’ bargaining 
share  θ . It matters:  if we change labor-mar-
ket policy, for instance, as long as  ε ′ (n) ≠ 0 
the effects are different than predicted by 
bargaining.
Extensions allowing on-the-job search 
include Moen and Rosen (2004); Delacroix 
and Shi (2006); Garibaldi and Moen (2010); 
Schaal (2017); Tsuyuhara (2016); and 
Garibaldi, Moen, and Sommervoll (2016). 
Among other reasons, this is interest-
ing because data show there are many 
direct job-to-job transitions (Fallick and 
Fleischman 2001; Christensen et al. 2005). 
As in Delacroix and Shi (2006), let  κ > 0 
be workers’ cost of search while employed, 
assumed small enough that at least some 
workers search while employed. This gener-
ates wage dispersion. Let  n (w) be the ratio of 
vacancies to job seekers in a submarket with 
wage  w . The problem of a worker employed 
at  w is
(25)  r V s1 (w) = w + δ [ V s0 −  V s1 (w) ] 
 +  max 
 w ′ ,Σ
 Σ {α [n ( w ′ ) ] [ V s1 ( w ′ ) 
−  V s1 (w) ] − κ} , 
where  Σ = 1 ( Σ = 0 ) indicates he engages 
in (abstains from) search, and if  Σ = 1 then 
w ′ is the next wage to which he directs his 
search.
An unemployed worker’s value function 
is similar to a worker employed at  w = b , 
except it is assumed that the former has no 
search cost, so  V s0 =  V s1 (b) + κ . Also, work-
ers are more selective in terms of the 
next targeted wage  w ′ when their current 
wage  w is higher (see appendix C). Solving 
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for  equilibrium requires finding  n (w) . To 
begin, write
 r  V b0 = − k +  
α [n (w) ]  _
n (w) 
 [ V b1 (w) −  V b0 ] ,
 r  V b1 (w) = y − w 
 +  [δ + π (w) ] [ V b0 −  V b1 (w) ] , 
where the only change from the baseline 
model is that jobs now end with an exog-
enous probability  δ plus the endogenous 
probability  π (w) that a worker gets a better 
offer. Now free entry implies  V b0 = 0 , or
(26)  k =  




 ___________  
r + δ + π (w) 
. 
Then  κ > 0 implies there is a  w 
¯
such that 
workers employed at  w ≥  w 
¯
naturally 
stop searching. For firms paying  w ≥  w 
¯
, 
 π (w) = 0 , and (26) identifies the  n (w) that 
coincides with what one gets without on-the-
job search.
Under the hypothetical situation that  n (w) 
is computed this way everywhere, we can 
find the lowest wage at which the solution to 
(25) involves no search, and that identifies  w 
¯
. 
Then, by way of induction, notice there is a 
minimum wage increment Δ that workers 
require to justify search (appendix C). 
Hence, those employed at  w ∈  [ w ¯− Δ,  w ¯) only seek jobs with  w ′ ≥  w 
¯
, for which we 
have already determined  n ( w ′ ) . Given  w ,  w ′ 
is the unique solution to (25), denoted  w ′ 
= ω (w) . Then  π (w) = α ◦ n ◦ ω (w) , where 
for any functions  f and  g ,  f ◦ g (x) denotes 
the composite  f [g (x) ] . Knowing  π (w) ,  ∀ w ∈ 
[ w ¯
− Δ,  w 
¯)
 , entry condition (26) yields 
 n (w) at these wages. Repeating the proce-
dure for  w ∈  [ w ¯− 2Δ,  w ¯− Δ) yields  π (w) and  n (w) at those wages, and so on, until 
 n (w) and  π (w) are determined for all  w .
This establishes  n (w) and  π (w)  ∀ w without 
reference to the distribution of employment 
across  w , in and out of steady state, again 
due to block recursivity. Starting with higher 
unemployment, for example, lots of job seek-
ers search for  w = ω (b) , but also lots of firms 
post  w = ω (b) , keeping  n (w) as determined 
above. Thus, we can first solve for the value 
functions and decision rules (block 1), then 
study the evolution of  e from any initial con-
dition (block 2), and only in the second step 
does the distribution of employment come 
into play. Extensions of this insight allow 
tractable analysis of business cycle models 
where aggregate productivity  y is stochas-
tic. In these models, current  y is enough to 
compute tightness in each submarket, say 
 n (w, y) , which is easier than it would be if  n 
depended on the distribution of  w ; see Shi 
(2009), Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011), Schaal 
(2017), and Li and Weng (2017).
To recap, there are  n w wages, 
 w 1 <  w 2 < ⋯ <   w  n w  . The unemployed 
apply to  w 1 = ω (b) ; workers employed 
at  w 1 apply to  w 2 = ω ( w 1 ) ; and so on, until 
they stop searching. It can be shown that  n w 
decreases with search and entry costs. Also, 
simple wage contracts do not induce effi-
ciency, similar to the model in subsection 2.2 
with multiple applications. With on-the-job 
search, firms care about both recruitment 
and retention, and a single wage is not suf-
ficient to balance the two. This is especially 
clear when all matches produce the same  y , 
which means on-the-job search is rent seek-
ing that has a social cost but does not increase 
output. However, more complicated con-
tracts that directly specify search activity, 
or specify transfers when workers quit, can 
restore efficiency (Menzio and Shi 2011). 
Research on labor markets with directed 
search is a vibrant area. As regards business 
cycle fluctuations, in particular, Menzio and 
Moen (2010) show that the optimal wage 
contract with aggregate productivity shocks 
prescribes rigid wages for existing workers 
and downward rigidity for new hires. Menzio 
and Shi (2011) exploit block recursivity to 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIX (March 2021)106
develop a tractable model of unemployment, 
vacancies, and job-to-job transitions over the 
cycle. In their model, transitions are driven 
by heterogeneity in firm–worker matches. 
They show the labor market’s response to 
aggregate shocks is large only if the quality 
of the match is observed after the match is 
created. Schaal (2017) also uses a directed 
search model to study business cycles, focus-
ing on the impact of time-varying idiosyn-
cratic shocks at the establishment level. Guo 
(2018) also uses directed search to study 
recessions in a model with endogenous 
schooling and heterogeneous agents.
PROPOSITION 3: The dynamic labor model 
without on-the-job search has a unique equi-
librium and it is efficient. At each point in 
time,  n solves  T (n) = 0 and  w solves (21). 
The outcome with on-the-job search is simi-
lar, except there is wage dispersion, and effi-
ciency requires more complicated contracts.
4. Monetary Economics
Monetary theory has used random match-
ing at least since Kiyotaki and Wright 
(1989), and that model has been recast using 
directed search by Corbae, Temzelides, and 
Wright (2002, 2003). We present the simple 
version in Julien, Kennes, and King (2008), 
with indivisible assets, then consider divisi-
ble assets.
4.1 Indivisible Assets
A fixed  [0,  N ¯ ] continuum of ex ante identi-
cal agents live forever in discrete time; there 
is no entry. Also, there are no centralized 
markets, as all trade is bilateral, and that is 
hindered by specialization: there are many 
types of goods, and it is never the case in 
a pairwise meeting that agent  i consumes 
what  j produces and vice versa, ruling out 
direct barter. Assumptions on limited com-
mitment and private information rule out 
credit, so that assets have an essential role as 
media of exchange.
Equal measures of agents consume and 
produce each good. Everyone has the same 
utility  u (q) for goods they consume and 
cost  c (q) for those they produce. Goods 
are nonstorable. There is a storable asset 
that generates utility  ρ each period for any-
one holding it:  if  ρ > 0 this is a dividend 
as in standard asset-pricing theory (Lucas 
1978); if  ρ < 0 it is a storage cost (Kiyotaki 
and Wright 1989); and if  ρ = 0 the asset 
is fiat money according to standard usage 
(Wallace 1980). Individual asset holdings are 
restricted to  m ∈  {0, 1} , so given a fixed 
supply  M ∈  (0,  N ¯ ) ,  M agents have  m = 1 
and act as buyers while  N ¯ − M have  m = 0 
and act as sellers.18
A novelty compared to the above models 
is that after trade the buyer becomes a seller 
and vice versa. Letting  Δ =  V b −  V s be the 
value to getting an asset and switching from 
seller to buyer, in steady state we have
(27)  V b = ρ +  α b [u (q) − βΔ] + β  V b ,
(28)  V s =  α s [βΔ − c (q) ] + β  V s . 
As usual,  α s = α (n) and  α b = α (n) / n 
with  n = M / ( N ¯ − M) and  α (n) comes from 
a general meeting technology, although many 
papers use  μ = M ( N ¯ − M) / N ¯ , following 
18 This environment is from Shi (1995) and Trejos and 
Wright (1995), but those papers use random search and 
symmetric bargaining. This is extended to other bargain-
ing solutions by Rupert, Schindler, and Wright (2001) 
and Trejos and Wright (2016). There are also versions 
with posting and random search by Curtis and Wright 
(2004), or posting and noisy search by Burdett, Trejos, and 
Wright (2017). Wallace (2010) and  references therein use 
abstract mechanism design. The first paper to use posting 
and directed search is Julien, Kennes, and King (2008), 
with extensions by Julien, Kennes, and Schein (2016) and 
He and Wright (2019).
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the specification in Kiyotaki and Wright 
(1991, 1993).
Directed search plays two roles: first, the 
economy segments into markets trading dif-
ferent goods; second, each market segments 
into submarkets based on posted terms. 
Appendix A shows the FOCs for the submar-
ket problem lead to
(29)  
βΔ  =   
ε (n) u ′ (q) c (q) +  [1 − ε (n) ] c ′ (q) u (q)    ______________________________  
ε (n) u ′ (q) +  [1 − ε (n) ] c ′ (q) 
 . 
The right-hand side (RHS), denoted  g (q, n) 
in (16), is again the same as Nash bargaining 
except  ε (n) replaces  θ ; different from sub-
section 3.1, instead of an exogenous limit  L , 
the value of assets and hence the ability to 
pay are endogenous.
To proceed, subtract (27)–(28) and solve 
for
(30)  βΔ =  
ρ +  α b u (q) +  α s c (q)   _________________ r +  α b +  α s 
 . 
Then  n = M / ( N ¯ − M) determines  ε ,  α b , 
and  α s . A stationary monetary equilibrium 
(SME) is then a  q equating the RHSs  of 
(29) and (30), where  q ∈  (0,  q ¯ ) , with 
 u ( q ¯ ) = c ( q ¯ ) , as required for voluntary 
trade. In the special but natural case  ρ = 0 , 
one can show there is a unique SME (see He 
and Wright 2019 for details).
To emphasize the interplay between 
directed search and monetary economics, 
consider the unique SME with  ρ = 0 , and 
the meeting technology commonly used in 
the literature, with  N ¯ = 1 and  μ = M (1 − M) . 
Then  M = 1 / 2 is good for trade on the 
extensive margin, since it maximizes the 
number of buyer–seller meetings, but it 
does less well on the intensive margin, 
since it implies  q <  q ∗ . Trejos and Wright 
(1995) show  q <  q ∗ at  M = 1 / 2 using Nash 
bargaining with  θ = 1 / 2 . In competitive 
search equilibrium, the result  q <  q ∗ at 
 M = 1 / 2 follows without restrictions 
on  θ because  ε (n) = 1 / 2 holds automat-
ically at  M = 1 / 2 . Thus, we get similar 
results with fewer conditions, something that 
is typical of applications using competitive 
search theory.
As another connection between directed 
search and money, consider dynamics. The 
model sketched here has nonstationary equi-
libria for some parameters, where the value 
of the asset varies over time, as a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy. That is also true with Nash 
bargaining models, but the microfounda-
tions can be criticized in nonstationary equi-
libria (Coles and Wright 1998). This critique 
does not apply to competitive search, and 
so one can say it provides a more rigorous 
model of dynamics based on liquidity con-
siderations (more on this in subsection 9.1). 
Moreover, monetary models with competi-
tive search are important in the literature, as 
early work was criticized by those who dislike 
random matching and bargaining. It is thus 
good to know that most insights also apply 
with directed search and posting.
4.2 Divisible Assets
Now let agents hold any  m ∈  ℝ + and 
bring back the frictionless CM  convening 
after each DM. A nice feature of the CM in 
this kind of application is that it harnesses the 
distribution of  m , plus it allows one to incor-
porate many elements of mainstream macro 
in search models. Yet another is that we do 
not have to say whether agents are buyers 
or sellers depending on their current  m as 
in subsection 4.1; instead we can have some 
called buyers that always want to consume 
but cannot produce in the DM, while others 
called sellers produce but do not consume. 
This would not work with only DM trade.
Focusing on  ρ = 0 buyers’ CM problem is
(31)  W b (m)  =   max x,ℓ, m ˆ  {U (x) − ℓ + β  V b,+1 ( m ˆ ) }  
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subject to
  x = wℓ + ϕ (m −  m ˆ ) − T, 
where  m is cash brought in,  m ˆ is cash taken 
out,  ϕ is its price in terms of numeraire  x , 
and  T is a lump sum tax. Other than keeping 
track of time with the subscript on  V b,+1 ( m ˆ ) , 
(31) is like (11) with one exception:  there, 
buyers get DM  goods on credit due in the 
next CM; here, credit is infeasible because 
of issues with commitment and information, 
so buyers need assets as payment instru-
ments. Still, as in subsection 3.1 we have 
 W b ′(m) = ϕ , so CM  payoffs are linear. 
Sellers do not bring cash to the DM, but 
buyers may, and their FOC  for  m ˆ > 0 is 
 ϕ = β  V b,+1 ′ ( m ˆ ) . Since  m does not appear in 
this FOC,  m ˆ does not depend on what agents 
bring into the CM.19
In the current CM,  ( p +1 ,  q +1 ,  n +1 ) is 
posted for the next DM, where  p +1 is the 
real value of the monetary payment. Since 
cash is a poor savings vehicle, buyers hold 
just enough so that  ϕ +1 m ˆ =  p +1 . Again, it 
may seem natural to have sellers post and 
buyers search, but it is equivalent to assume 
the opposite. Ignoring constants and time 
subscripts, after some algebra, we have
(32)  V b =  max p,q,n { 
α (n)  _n [u (q) − p] − ip}  
subject to 
α (n) [p − c (q) ] =  V s 
where  i is a nominal interest rate defined 
by the Fisher equation,  1 + i = ϕ / β  ϕ +1 . 
19 This history independence, which makes the DM dis-
tribution of  m ˆ across buyers degenerate, follows from 
quasilinear utility and the interiority of  ℓ , but both can be 
relaxed as discussed in footnote 15. The distribution is not 
degenerate in the closely related models of Galenianos and 
Kircher (2008) and Dutu, Julien, and King (2012), but is 
still tractable due to history independence.
In stationary equilibrium  ϕM is constant, so 
inflation is  ϕ / ϕ +1 =  M +1 / M . This plus the 
Fisher equation imply it is equivalent for 
monetary policy to peg the money growth, 
inflation, or nominal interest rate.
Problem (32) is the same as (15) but for 
one detail: buyers now must make an ex ante 
investment in liquidity, at cost  i p +1 , before 
going to the DM. Taking the FOC for  q , we 
get
(33)  in / α (n) = λ (q) 
where  λ (q) ≡  [ u ′ (q) −  c ′ (q) ] / c ′ (q) is the 
liquidity premium. The FOC for  n yields
(34)  α (n) [1 − ε (n) ] [u (q) − c (q) ] 
 =  V s +  
i V s nε (n)  _
α (n) 
 , 
and the constraint yields  p = g (q, n) , 
where  g is defined in (16). With  n = N , (33) 
determines  q and (34) determines  V s ; with 
entry by sellers,  V s =  k s , and (33)–(34) 
determines  (q, n) jointly, where in particular,
(35)  
 k s =  
α (n) [1 − ε (n) ] c ′ (q) [u (q) − c (q) ]    ____________________________  
ε (n) u ′ (q) +  [1 − ε (n) ] c ′ (q) 
 . 
By way of comparison, consider the planner’s 
problem with entry by sellers,
  max 
q,n
 { 
α (n)  _n [u (q) − c (q) ] −  
 k s  _n } . 
The FOCs are
(36)  u ′ (q) =  c ′ (q) ,
(37)  k s = α (n) [1 − ε (n) ] [u (q) − c (q) ] . 
Clearly, (36)  implies  q =  q ∗ . From (33) 
this is the same as equilibrium if and 
only if  i = 0 , the Friedman rule. Then 
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(37)   determines  n =  n ∗ , and from (34) 
this is the same as equilibrium at  i = 0 . 
Competitive search thus delivers the first-best 
at  i = 0 .
Next, consider generalized Nash bargain-
ing. This implies  p = g (q, n) with  θ instead 
of  ε , plus
(38)  ni _ 
α (n) 
=  
 u ′ (q) −  g q (q, n)   _____________
 g q (q, n) 
 ,
(39)  k s =  
α (n) (1 − θ) c ′ (q) [u (q) − c (q) ]    __________________________  
θ u ′ (q) +  (1 − θ) c ′ (q) 
 . 
Now (38) is the same as (33) when  θ = 1 , and 
then it is the same as (36) if and only if  i = 0 . 
Intuitively, for buyers to make the efficient 
ex ante investment in liquidity, they need 
all the bargaining power in the DM; oth-
erwise,  q <  q ∗ with Nash bargaining even 
at  i = 0 . But for sellers to make the efficient 
ex ante entry decision, they need  θ = ε (n) , 
since that makes (39)  the same as (35). As 
we cannot have both  θ = 1 and  θ = ε (n) , 
in general, bargaining is not efficient; com-
petitive search equilibrium is efficient even 
with two-sided holdup problems.20
The model is generalized by Lagos and 
Rocheteau (2005) by fixing  n = N but intro-
ducing endogenous search effort by buyers 
to try to capture the “hot potato”  effect of 
inflation (people spend money faster when  i 
is higher). As they show, this cannot happen 
with Nash bargaining. The reason is that  i 
is effectively a tax on DM  activity, making 
buyers bring less money in real terms, which 
lowers the gains from trade and leads to less 
search effort; hence, they end up spend-
ing their money slower rather than faster. 
With competitive search,  however, even 
20 This is similar to some papers on labor markets with 
two-sided investment, including Acemoglu and Shimer 
(1999 a ) and Masters (2011). If, for example, firms invest 
in physical capital and workers in human capital, gener-
ally bargaining cannot deliver efficiency, but competitive 
search can.
though higher  i lowers the total DM  sur-
plus, it can shift the terms of trade in favor 
of buyers for some parameters, leading 
to more search effort and a “hot potato” 
effect.
Going back to efficiency, the problem 
described as “Friedman Meets Hosios”  by 
Berentsen, Rocheteau, and Shi (2007) is that 
with Nash bargaining it is not generally pos-
sible to have  θ = ε (n) and  θ = 1 , so even 
at  i = 0 we cannot get  ( q ∗ ,  n ∗ ) with Nash 
bargaining. While other bargaining solutions 
may do better (Aruoba, Rocheteau, and 
Waller 2007; Hu, Kennan, and Wallace 2009; 
Gu and Wright 2016) we still do not generally 
get efficiency at  i = 0 . In competitive search 
equilibrium we do. In a quantitative appli-
cation, Rocheteau and Wright (2005)  com-
pare the effects of inflation with competitive 
search and Nash bargaining and find it makes 
a big difference.21
In Faig and Huangfu (2007), market mak-
ers post terms for their submarkets to attract 
buyers and sellers, as discussed above. 
Recognizing that carrying currency is costly 
when  i > 0 , a shrewd market maker pro-
poses this: all buyers pay  ϕ b to enter his sub-
market, then buyers that meet sellers get the 
goods for free and all sellers collect  ϕ s when 
they exit the DM. This allows agents to share 
in the cost of liquidity by eliminating cash in 
the hands of buyers who do not meet sellers, 
with market makers acting like the bankers 
in Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007). 
This is a nice example of how microstructure 
matters. In other work, Dong (2011) revis-
its Rocheteau, Rupert, and Wright (2007), 
which has indivisible labor,  ℓ ∈  {0, 1} , as 
in Rogerson (1998). This generates unem-
ployment, and there is a long-run Phillips 
21 See also Bethune, Choi, and Wright (2020); Dong 
(2010); Ennis (2008); Faig and Jerez (2006, 2007); 
Huangfu (2009); Dong and Jiang (2014); and Carbonari, 
Mattesini, and Waldman (2019). All this work underscores 
the importance of carefully modeling price formation.
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curve exploitable by policy. Intuitively, infla-
tion lowers  q in the DM, that raises (low-
ers)  x in the CM if the goods are substitutes 
(complements), and employment comoves 
with  x . Rocheteau et al. (2008) prove this in a 
bargaining model with  θ = 1 ; Dong (2011) 
uses competitive search and proves it with no 
such restriction, showing another advantage 
of competitive search.
Menzio, Shi, and Sun  (2013) provide an 
alternative approach with no CM and hence a 
nondegenerate distribution, but it is still trac-
table due to block recursivity. Buyers select 
into submarkets:  those with more  m ˆ pre-
fer higher  p and  q so they can trade sooner; 
those with less  m ˆ prefer lower  p and  q, even 
if it takes longer. Submarkets cater to their 
desires with different tightness, given entry 
by sellers. Since equilibrium separates buy-
ers with different  m ˆ , their choices are inde-
pendent of the distribution, and thus so is 
tightness in any submarket. Sun and Zhou 
(2018)  integrate elements of this and the 
alternating CM–DM  framework presented 
above. Other natural applications include 
Rocheteau, Wright, and Xiao (2018) and Han 
et al. (2016). All this speaks to the usefulness 
of competitive search in monetary economics.
5. Deeper Foundations: Finite Markets
Directed search theory with finite num-
bers of agents playing a well-defined game 
is developed in a series of papers by Peters 
(1984; 1991; 1997a, b; 2000). The presenta-
tion here follows Julien, Kennes, and King 
(2000) and Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001).
5.1 A  2 × 2 Market
Consider a market with  two buyers 
and  two sellers. Each seller can produce and 
each buyer wants to consume   one unit of 
indivisible good  q , with the latter paying the 
former  p using a divisible good  x that enters 
payoffs linearly (i.e., we revert to transferable 
utility). The game proceeds as follows: first, 
sellers post prices; then, given  p =  ( p 1 ,  p 2 ) , 
buyers decide where to go. If both buyers 
visit the same seller, one is chosen at ran-
dom to get the good. Payoffs for buyers and 
sellers that trade are  u − p and  p − c , and we 
impose  p j ∈  [c, u] without loss of generality. 
The strategy of buyer  1 is  γ 1j , the probability 
he goes to seller  j , and similarly for buyer  2 .
Given buyer  2 ’s strategy, payoffs for 
buyer  1 from visiting sellers  1 and  2 are
(40)  V b11 =  (1 −  γ 21 +  
 γ 21  _
2
 ) (u −  p 1 ) ,
(41)  V b12 =  ( γ 21 +  
1 −  γ 21  _
2
 ) (u −  p 2 ) . 
In words, (40) says that at seller  1 , buyer  1 
gets served for sure if buyer  2 goes to seller  2 , 
which happens with probability  1 −  γ 21 , and 
gets served with probability  1 / 2 if buyer  2 
goes to seller  1 , which happens with proba-
bility  γ 21 . Given  p , it is easy to check the best 
response of buyer  1 is




if   γ 21 > Γ (p) 
  [0, 1] if   γ 21 = Γ (p)
1 if   γ 21 < Γ (p) 
where   Γ (p) ≡  (u +  p 2 − 2  p 1 ) / (2u −  p 1 −  p 2 ) .
For any  p , equilibrium in the stage 2 game 
between buyers is:
1. If  p 1 ≥  (u +  p 2 ) / 2 then  ( γ 11 ,  γ 21 ) 
=  (0, 0) (both buyers go to seller  2 ).
2. If  p 1 ≤ 2  p 2 − u then  ( γ 11 ,  γ 21 ) 
=  (1, 1) (both buyers go to seller  1 ).
3. If  (u +  p 2 ) / 2 > p > 2  p 2 − u there 
are three possible equilibria:
  •  ( γ 11 ,  γ 21 ) =  (0, 1) (buyer  1 goes to 
seller  2 , buyer  2 goes to seller  1 );
  •  ( γ 11 ,  γ 21 ) =  (1, 0) (buyer  1 goes to 
seller  1 , buyer  2 goes to seller  2 );
  •  γ 11 =  γ 21 = Γ ( p 1 ,  p 2 ) (buyers play 
symmetric mixed strategies). 
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Given this and  p 2 the payoff for seller  1 at 
stage  1 as a function of  p 1 is:
1. If  p 1 ≥  (u +  p 2 ) / 2 then  V s1 = 0 
(seller  1 gets no buyers).
2. If  p 1 ≤ 2  p 2 − u then  V s1 =  p 1 − c 
(seller  1 gets both buyers).
3. If  (u +  p 2 ) / 2 > p > 2  p 2 − u then 
two things can happen:
  •  a pure-strategy equilibria with 
 V s1 =  p 1 − c ;
  •  a mixed-strategy equilibrium with 
 V s1 =  [1 −  (1 − γ) 2 ] ( p 1 − c) , where 
 γ = Γ ( p 1 ,  p 2 ) , or, after simplification,
(43)  
 V s1 =  
3 (u −  p 2 ) (u − 2  p 1 +  p 2 ) ( p 1 − c)    __________________________
 (2u −  p 1 −  p 2 ) 2 
 . 
Now the set of equilibria in pricing can 
be described as follows: one possibility 
is  p 1 =  p 2 = u ,  γ 11 = 1 , and  γ 21 = 0 
(for sure buyer  1 goes to seller  1 and 
buyer  2 goes to seller  2 ), which is an equi-
librium since buyers can do no better at 
this  p , and sellers can never do better than 
this. Symmetrically,  p 1 =  p 2 = u ,  γ 11 = 0, 
and  γ 21 = 1 is an equilibrium. Burdett, Shi, 
and Wright (2001) show there are also many 
asymmetric equilibria supported by trig-
gers.22 Rather than dwelling on these, let 
22 Here is the idea: Pick any  p such that it is an equili-
birum for buyer  1 to go to seller  1 and buyer  2 to go to 
seller  2 for sure. If any seller deviates, let buyers play 
this equilibrium at stage  2 :  If  p 1 ≥  (u +  p 2 ) / 2 both go 
to seller  2 ; if  p 1 ≤ 2  p 2 − u both go to seller  1 ; and if 
(u +  p 2 ) / 2 > p > 2  p 2 − u they play the mixed equilib-
rium. Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) characterize the set  
such that  p ∈  allows no profitable deviation. Intuitively, 
there is no profitable deviation that makes both buyers go 
to the same seller at stage  2 , and it is not easy to find a prof-
itable deviation that leads to a mixed equilibrium at stage  2 , 
because sellers do poorly in mixed equilibria. For any  p 
such that profits are not too low, no one wants to deviate 
us focus on symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
libria, as in much of the literature. This can 
be motivated by arguing that pure strategies 
rely on a lot of coordination, which may be 
reasonable in a  2 × 2 market, but is less so in 
large markets (Bland and Loertscher 2012, 
Norman 2016).
Therefore, consider non-coordinated 
equilibria where buyers mix at stage  2 . 
From the above discussion, this requires 
(u +  p 2 ) / 2 >  p 1 > 2  p 2 − u ,  shown  as 
the unshaded region in figure 4 . In this 
region, choosing  p 1 to maximize  V s1 leads to
(44)  
 p 1 =  
2 ( u 2 −  p 2 c) +  (u −  p 2 ) ( p 2 + 2c)    __________________________  
5 (u −  p 2 ) + 2 (u − c) 
 . 
Now (44) defines seller  1 ’s best response 
 p 1 = R ( p 2 ) , and symmetrically  p 2 = R ( p 1 ) . 
As figure 4 shows, there is a unique stage 1 
equilibrium in the class under consider-
ation,  p 1 =  p 2 =  (u + c) / 2 . Then the unique 
stage 2 equilibrium has  γ 11 =  γ 12 = 1/2 , which 
means buyers pick sellers at random (although 
the fact that search can be directed off the 
equilibrium path disciplines prices on it).
In this equilibrium, half the time both 
buyers visit the same seller, so one buyer 
and seller do not trade: as in Lagos (2000), 
simultaneously some buyers do not get 
served and some sellers have no customers. 
In fact,  μ = 3 / 2 is the expected number 
of trades, which is inefficient in the sense 
that  μ = 2 is physically feasible. Yet in 
another sense it is fairly good. Suppose both 
buyers go to seller  1 with arbitrary probabil-
ity  γ . Then the chance they both go to the 
same seller is  γ 2 +  (1 − γ) 2 , which is min-
imized at  γ = 1 / 2 . Also, while the total 
expected surplus is not maximized, buyers 
like this  equilibrium because  V b =  V s = 
and trigger mixing at stage  2 . See also Camera and Kim 
(2016), who study an infinitely repeated version.
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIX (March 2021)112
3 (u + c) / 8 , while they get  V b = 0 in pure- 
strategy equilibrium with  p 1 =  p 2 = u . We 
summarize as follows.
PROPOSITION 4: In the  2 × 2 market there 
exists a unique non-coordinated equilibrium, 
which is  p j =  (u + c) / 2 and  γ ij = 1 / 2 . 
The expected number of trades is  μ = 3 / 2 
and the individual trading probabilities 
are  α b =  α s = 3 / 4 .
In addition to posting, Julien, Kennes, and 
King (2000) consider auctions:  if  one buyer 
shows up he pays the posted price; and if  two 
show up they bid, resulting in the Bertrand 
price  p ¯ = u . One can think of sellers post-
ing a reserve price, denoted  p 
¯
below. Given 
this, the analogs of (40) and (41) are
     V b11 =  (1 −  γ 21 ) (u −  p 1 )  
and
     V b12 =  γ 21 (u −  p 2 ) , 
because a buyer gets  0 surplus unless he is 
the only one visiting a seller. A  mixed-strategy 







Figure 4. Best Response in Price Posting in the 2 × 2 Market
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=  (u −  p 1 ) / (2u −  p 1 −  p 2 ) . Then one can 
check that sellers have a dominant strat-
egy,  p 
¯
=  (u + c) / 2 . So in equilibrium, the 
reserve price is same as the posted price 
in the benchmark model. However, profit 
is higher:  V s =  (u + c) / 2 with auctions 
and  V s = 3 (u + c) / 8 with posting.
Coles and Eeckhout (2003)  integrate the 
approaches by letting sellers post  p contin-
gent on the number of buyers that show 
up, say  p Q ( Q for queue length). This nests 
pure posting with  p 1 =  p 2 , and auctions 
with  p 2 =  p ¯ = u and  p 1 =  p 
¯
. They 
show there is an equilibrium with  p 1 =  p 2 
=  (u + c) / 2 , as in the baseline model, but 
there are many others as well, all with  p 1 
=  (u + c) / 2 , and any  p 2 ∈  [c, u] . They are 
not payoff equivalent, and profit is highest 
with auctions. To see why, note first that 
a seller is indifferent to posting any pair 
( p 1 ,  p 2 ) delivering  V b to buyers, but not 
indifferent to his rival’s posting. Suppose, for 
example, a seller lowers his  p to increase the 
probability that customers come to him. That 
decreases the probability that they go to his 
rival, so if they go to his rival they are more 
likely to get  p 1 and less likely to get  p 2 . Ergo, 
stealing business is harder, and as a result 
profit is higher, when sellers post  p 1 <  p 2 
rather than  p 1 =  p 2 .
An exceptional case is the Coles–Eeckhout 
equilibrium where  p 2 = c is at its minimum 
value. In this equilibrium a buyer gets the 
same expected payoff,  (u − c) / 2 , whether or 
not the other one shows up, with the expec-
tation taken before it is determined who gets 
the good if both show up. Hence, a seller’s 
deviation does not affect buyers’ expected 
payoffs when they visit his rival, and the stra-
tegic effect in the previous paragraph is inop-
erative—so one might say the market utility 
approach is valid. We say more on this in sub-
section 5.3.23
23 Let us first mention a way around the Coles–Eeckhout 
indeterminacy, due to Dutu, Huangfu, and Julien (2011), 
5.2 The  n b ×  n s Market
Consider any integer numbers of buyers 
and sellers,  n b and  n s . A pure price post-
ing strategy for seller  j is  p j ∈  [c, u] , and 
we let  p =  ( p 1 , … ,  p  n s  ) . A search strat-
egy for buyer  i is  γ i =  ( γ i1 , … ,  γ i n s  ) , 
with  γ ij the probability he visits seller  j , and 
we let  γ =  ( γ 1 , … ,  γ  n b  ) . An equilibrium is a 
(p, γ)  such that no one wants to deviate, and 
a symmetric equilibrium is one with  p j = p 
and  γ ij = 1 / n s . To check for equilib-
rium we need to know what happens after 
a seller deviates. Starting at a symmetric 
 p =  (p, p,…, p) , suppose some seller, 
say  j = 1 , deviates to  p 1 so that  p 
=  ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) . We now check if this is profit-
able, given a symmetric equilibrium after the 
deviation.
Let the probability any buyer visits seller  1 
after his deviation be  γ 1 =  γ 1 ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) . A 
symmetric subgame-perfect  equilibrium is 
described by  p and  γ 1 ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) satisfying 
the following conditions: (i)   p 1 = p max-
imizes  V s1 ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) ; (ii)  γ 1 ∗( p 1 ,  p −1 ) con-
stitutes an equilibrium in the subgame for 
any  p 1 and  p −1 =  (p, …,  p) ; and (iii) on the 
equilibrium path  γ ij = 1 / n s , while after a 
deviation buyers go to seller  1 with proba-
bility  γ 1 =  γ 1 ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) and all other sellers 
with probability  γ ¯ 1 =  (1 −  γ 1 ) / ( n s − 1) .
PROPOSITION 5: In an  n b ×  n s market, 
let  n =  n b / n s and  η = 1 − 1 / n s . Then 
in monetary economies. They show there is an equilibrium 
with  p 1 =  (u + c) / 2 and any  p 2 ∈  [c, u] at  i = 0 . By 
continuity, for  i > 0 there is an equilibrium with  p 1 close 
to  (u + c) / 2 , but more care is needed to determine  p 2 , as 
buyers must decide in the CM how much  m ˆ to bring to the 
DM. Consider equilibrium where some bring  ϕ m ˆ =  p 1 
and others  ϕ m ˆ =  p 2 , and they are indifferent, taking into 
account the cost  iϕ m ˆ . This provides an additional equi-
librium condition to pin down  p 2 . Hence, this particular 
indeterminacy vanishes in monetary economies (although 
introducing money as usual engenders other types of mul-
tiplicity). Again this shows how directed search and mone-
tary economics are intimately related.
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there exists a unique non-coordinated equi-
librium, and in this equilibrium every seller 
sets
(45)  p =  
 (1 −  η  n b  − n η  n b −1 ) u + n  η  n b  c   _______________________ 
1 −  η  n b  − n η  n b −1 + n  η  n b  
 , 
while every buyer visits each seller with 
probability  1 / n s . The expected number of 
trades is
(46)  μ = μ ( n b ,  n s ) =  n s (1 −  η  n b  ) . 
PROOF:
Start at  p =  (p, p, … ,  p) , let seller  1 
deviate, and consider symmetric equilib-
ria where  γ 1 =  γ 1 ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) . Let the prob-
ability that at least one buyer visits seller  1 
be  α s1 =  α s1 ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) . Since he gets no cus-
tomers with probability  (1 −  γ 1 )  n b  , clearly,
(47)  α s1 = 1 −  (1 −  γ 1 )  n b  . 
Let the probability a buyer trades if he 
visits seller  1 be  α b1 =  α b1 ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) . Notice 
 n b  γ 1  α b1 =  α s1 , as the left-hand side (LHS) is 
the expected number of buyers who get 
served by seller  1 and the RHS is his expected 
number of sales. This and (47) imply
(48)  α b1 =  
1 −  (1 −  γ 1 )  n b    ____________ n b  γ 1  . 
Now the profit of the deviant seller is
(49)  V s1 ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) =  α s1 ( p 1 − c) 
=  [1 −  (1 −  γ 1 )  n b  ] ( p 1 − c) , 
and the payoff to a buyer visiting him is
(50)  V b1 ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) =  α b1 (u −  p 1 ) 
=  
1 −  (1 −  γ 1 )  n b    ____________ n b  γ 1  (u −  p 1 ) . 
Also, the payoff to a buyer visiting seller  j ≠ 1 
is
(51)  V bj ( p 1 ,  p −1 ) =  
1 −  (1 −  γ ¯ 1 )  n b    ___________ n b  γ ¯ 1  (u − p) . 
Given this, the FOC for maximizing  π 1 is
(52)  0 =  ∂ V s1  _∂ p 1 
 =  α s1 +  ( p 1 − c)  
∂ α s1  _∂ p 1 
 
=  α s1 +  n b  (1 −  γ 1 )  n b −1 ( p 1 − c) 
∂ γ 1  ___
 ∂ p 1 
. 
In a symmetric mixed equilibrium in the 
subgame, buyers are indifferent between vis-
iting any seller, which means  γ 1 satisfies
(53)   
1 −  (1 −  γ 1 )  n b    ____________ n b  γ 1  (u −  p 1 ) 
   =  
1 −  (1 −  γ ¯ 1 )  n b    ___________ n b  γ ¯ 1  (u − p) . 
Over the range  γ 1 ∈  (0, 1) , we can 
derive  ∂ γ 1 / ∂ p 1 and insert it into (52), then 
simplify using  p 1 = p and  γ 1 = 1 / n s to 
verify that a deviation is not profitable if 
and only if  p solves (45). Hence there is a 
unique symmetric equilibrium where buyers 
mix. Galenianos and Kircher (2012) prove 
there are no asymmetric equilibria where 
buyers mix and sellers use pure strategies. 
All that remains is to show  μ satisfies (46), 
but that follows directly from (47) and (48) 
with  γ 1 = 1 / n s .  ∎ 
Several remarks are in order. First, (45) 
endogenously gives  p as a weighted aver-
age of  c and  u , which might not be appar-
ent from Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) 
because they normalize  u = 1 and  c = 0 . 
In fact, the weight on  u is the probability a 
seller gets at least  2  buyers, and the weight 
on  c is the probability he gets just  1 . Second, 
as in the  2 × 2 game, in equilibrium buy-
ers visit sellers at random, but the fact that 
search can be directed still disciplines prices. 
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Third, notice that  p is a smooth  function 
of  n b and  n s , which we think is nice. To say 
why, let  n s be large, and note that as  n b goes 
from  n s − 1 to  n s + 1 , frictionless equilib-
rium theory predicts  p jumps from  c to  u . As 
shown in figure  5, with competitive search 
the discrete jump gets smoothed out by the 
frictions, which is one reason Peters (1984, 
1991) and others advocated the approach in 
the first place.
Fourth, (46) endogenously gives  μ ( n b ,  n s ) 
as an urn-ball meeting technology, used in 
economics at least since Butters (1977) 
and Hall (1979). The name reflects the fact 
that the number of buyers up at a seller is 
binomially distributed, like putting  n b balls 
in  n s urns in elementary probability theory, 
which converges to a Poisson distribution 
as  n b ,  n s → ∞ for fixed  n =  n b / n s , with  e −n 
the probability a seller gets no buyers.24 Also 
note that  μ ( n b ,  n s ) displays DRS (decreas-
ing returns to scale) for finite  n b and  n s , but 
quickly converges to CRS as  n b and  n s grow. 
Finally, while we appeal to Galenianos and 
Kircher (2012) to claim uniqueness with 
homogeneous sellers, Kim and Camera 
24 From this it should be evident that it can matter who 
posts and who searches in finite markets, since throw-
ing  n b balls into  n s urns is not the same as throwing  n s balls 
into  n b urns (Kultti 2000; Halko, Kultti, and Virrankoski 
2008). Indeed, it matters even when  n b ,  n s → ∞ , where 
(based on proposition 6 below) the number of matches 
is  μ s =  n s (1 −  e n ) if sellers post and  μ b =  n b (1 −  e 1/n ) 
if buyers post. As Shi and Delacroix (2018) point out, in 
this case,  μ s >  μ b if and only if  n s <  n b , and hence we 
generate more meetings when the short side posts. They 
also show it does not matter when the matching function 
is symmetric, in the sense that the number of meetings  μ 
( n b ,  n s ) does not depend on who posts and who searches, 







p with competitive search
Figure 5. Price and Market Tightness
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(2014) extend this to  heterogeneity. These 
papers also consider more general meet-
ing technologies, risk aversion, and private 
information.
Versions of the above results can be 
found in Peters (2000), Julien, Kennes, 
and King (2000), or Burdett, Shi, and 
Wright (2001). Using standard formulae, 
they also imply the following result.
PROPOSITION 6: Let  n b ,  n s → ∞ hold-
ing  n =  n b / n s fixed. Then
(54)  p ( n b ,  n s ) →  [1 − ε (n) ] u + ε (n) c, 
where  ε (n) = n e −n / (1 −  e −n ) is the usual 
elasticity, and
(55)  α b ( n b ,  n s ) →  (1 −  e −n ) / n
and
    α s ( n b ,  n s ) → 1 −  e −n . 
As they did for the  2 × 2 market, Julien, 
Kennes, and King (2000, 2001) also con-
sider auctions in  n b ×  n s markets. They show 
that as  n b ,  n s → ∞ the reserve price goes 
to  p 
¯
= c , and payoffs are the same as under 
posting  (see appendix D for details). They 
also consider a dynamic labor market version, 
which generates steady-state unemployment 
and wage dispersion. Also, we mention that in 
Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) and Burdett, 
Shi, and Wright (2001), with entry, equilibrium 
is not efficient in the  n b ×  n s case, because 
the reserve price is positive, and because 
the matching function exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale for finite numbers. See Julien, 
Kennes, and King (2005, 2006b, 2011) for a 
discussion on how this relates to efficiency in 
Mortensen (1982b).
5.3 Issues, Applications and Extensions
The above methods allow us to deter-
mine  p without an exogenous bargaining 
solution, and to determine  α s and  α b without 
an exogenous meeting technology. While this 
is attractive, we keep an open mind. For the 
terms of trade, bargaining better captures 
situations without commitment and hence 
with holdup problems. For the trading prob-
abilities, (55) is a special case of models 
where  α s and  α b come from a general meet-
ing technology, which is relevant empirically 
to the extent that urn-ball functions can 
perform poorly when confronted with data 
(Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). Different 
approaches may be appropriate in different 
applications.
Having said that, a clear advantage to 
finite numbers concerns off-equilibrium 
beliefs: all we need is subgame perfection. 
With a continuum, however, things get 
tricky. Given a candidate equilibrium  p , if 
one seller from a continuum deviates, what 
is the best response of buyers? If the devi-
ator is measure  0 there is no response. The 
market utility approach skirts this issue in 
a way that is not entirely satisfactory. As an 
alternative, Galenianos and Kircher (2009) 
posit a set of artificial sellers with measure  δ 
that exogenously post every  p in the relevant 
range. They then properly evaluate deviation 
payoffs for  δ > 0 , and focus on equilibria 
that obtain when  δ → 0 . This works, but is 
slightly cumbersome.
An alternative going back to Montgomery 
(1991) is to use the market utility approach 
in  n b ×  n s markets by solving
(56)  V s =  max p,γ  α s (p − c) 
subject to
   α b (u − p) =  V b . 
In (56),  α s is the probability a seller gets 
at least  one buyer,  α b is the probability a 
buyer visiting the seller gets served, and 
both depend on the probability buyers visit 
the seller  γ , as derived in subsection 5.2. 
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Eliminating  p using the constraint and taking 
the FOC for  γ , we get  (1 − γ)  n b −1 u =  V b . 
In symmetric equilibrium, all sellers post the 
same  p and  γ = 1 / n s . Hence  V b =  η  n b −1 u , 
where  η = 1 − 1 / n s and
(57)  p =  
 (1 −  η  n b  − n  η  n b −1 ) u + n  η  n b −1 c   ________________________
1 −  η  n b   . 
This is nice, but not quite right—in a  2 × 2 
market, for instance, (45) gives  p =  (u + c) / 2 
while (57) gives  p =  (u + 2c) / 3 . To be fair, 
Montgomery (1991) solves the  2 × 2 model 
correctly, and acknowledges it is a “short 
cut” in the general case to take  V b as given after 
a seller deviates. The difference between (45) 
and (57) is the presence of  − n η  n b −1 + n η  n b  in 
the denominator of the former, so the Burdett, 
Shi, and Wright (2001) price is higher than 
the Montgomery price, because it is less 
attractive for a seller to lower his  p when 
he recognizes this increases buyers’ utility. 
However, as  n b ,  n s → ∞ holding  n fixed, 
this consideration vanishes, so Montgomery’s 
approach gives the right answer in large mar-
kets. In small markets, his approach can be 
misleading—for example, it yields efficiency 
in versions with entry or where sellers are 
heterogeneous, but only because it neglects 
relevant strategic effects.
Galenianos, Kircher, and Virag (2011) and 
Galenianos and Kircher (2012) propose a 
hybrid approach, solving (56) with  V b =  V b 
(γ) . This means sellers must offer buyers their 
market utility, but recognizes that it should 
be computed after a deviation. Given a sym-
metric mixed equilibrium after the deviation, 
and using (51) and  γ ¯ =  (1 − γ) / ( n s − 1) , we 
have
(58)  V b (γ) =  
1 −  (1 −  
1 − γ _ n s − 1
 ) 
 n b 
 
  ______________ 
 n b ( 
1 − γ _ n s − 1
 ) 
 (u −  p ∗ ) . 
Solving (56) with this  V b , then imposing equi-
librium, we get the  p in (45), which is cor-
rect for any  ( n b ,  n s ) . Hence we get the right 
result for small markets, but the method and 
 notation are similar to the earlier analysis of 
large markets.
One can extend this idea to make the anal-
ysis of finite markets closer to the continuum 
model. Given a finite number of buyers  N b 
and each using strategy  γ j ,  n j =  N b  γ j is the 
expected queue of buyers at a seller  j . The 
seller can trade if at least one buyer arrives, 
which has probability  1 −  (1 −  γ j )  N b  . Also, 
using  n j =  N b  γ j we obtain the matching 
function
(59)  α (n) = 1 −  (1 − n / N b )  N b  . 
This satisfies usual properties, and if the 
numbers of buyers and sellers go to infinity 
holding  n constant, it converges to the urn-
ball function,  1 −  e −n .
Let  V b (p) again be the payoff of buyers in 
the subgame after  p is posted. A seller  j who 
expects other sellers to set prices according 
to  p −j solves
(60)   max  p j , n j  α ( n j ) ( p j − c) 
subject to
   
α ( n j )  _ n j  (u −  p j ) =  V b ( p j ,  p −j ) , 
which is similar to (1), except now market 
utility depends on  p . Using the constraint to 
eliminate  p j , and taking the FOC for  n j , we 
get
(61)  α ′ ( n j ) (u − c) 
 −  V b (p) −  n j  
∂ V b (p)  _∂ p j 
  
∂ p j  _∂ n j 
= 0. 
In the last term on the LHS,  ∂ p j / ∂ n j gives the 
change in  p j needed to get a desired 
change in  n j , and  ∂ V b (p) / ∂ p j gives the change 
in market utility in the subgame. Note that in 
the continuum case, only the first two terms 
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in (61) appear. The last term leads to higher 
equilibrium prices: if a firm contemplates 
reducing its price, it understands that the 
additional customers it attracts reduce con-
gestion at its competitors, which makes the 
competitors endogenously more attractive. 
This can lead to inefficiency if we add entry 
or heterogeneity.25
Norman (2016) offers another approach, 
based on population uncertainty  (Myerson 
1998, 2000). Suppose  n b and  n s are inde-
pendently drawn from Poisson distributions, 
where sellers do not see the realization, 
while buyers see  n s and prices when they 
choose search strategies. This justifies the 
usual focus on symmetric equilibrium, 
where buyers use mixed strategies, since he 
shows any equilibrium is payoff equivalent 
to that (thus eliminating the other equilib-
ria mentioned in footnote 22). The Poisson 
assumption makes the model tractable. 
Also, this model belongs to a general class 
in which prices are strategic complements, 
which implies there is a unique equilibrium 
if there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. 
In addition, as usual, since  n b ,  n s → ∞ his 
outcome approaches our benchmark results. 
More generally, Norman’s ostensibly minor 
change in the environment generates many 
results in a tractable way, as should be useful 
in future applications.26
On a less technical note, Burdett, Shi, 
and Wright (2001) consider two types of 
25 Galenianos, Kircher, and Virag (2011) show that, with 
heterogeneous sellers, there is too much trade at those 
with high costs because the strategic effects increase prices 
more for those with low costs. Price ceilings, or minimum 
wages in labor markets, can restore efficiency.
26 He also generalizes Galenianos and Kircher 
(2012) and Kim and Camera (2014). First, he shows sellers’ 
profits are strictly concave in the relevant range. Then he 
shows his reduced-form game is supermodular under more 
general conditions than previous authors. This is useful 
because supermodular games have a smallest and largest 
equilibrium, and the existence of pure strategy equilibrium 
is simple. Because profit is strictly concave, mixed strate-
gies by sellers are ruled out. He also provides a simple test 
for uniqueness with symmetric sellers.
sellers with different capacity:   n 1 of them 
have  one unit for sale;  n 2 have  two units; 
and  n s =  n 1 + 2  n 2 is the total quantity on 
the market. This implies a matching func-
tion  μ ( n b ,  n 1 ,  n 2 ) , which in general does 
not reduce to a function of only  ( n b ,  n s ) . 
Intuitively, the coordination friction is worse 
when there are more sellers with  one unit 
and fewer with  two , holding  n s constant. 
In a labor application, this helps account 
for a changing Beveridge curve in the data, 
as the relationship between unemploy-
ment and total vacancies shifts with the 
mix of big and small firms. Lester (2010) 
extends this by letting firms choose how 
many positions to open, and studies the 
implications of various shocks, depending 
on whether job creation occurs via entry 
by new firms or expansion by existing firms 
(see also Tan 2012, Li and Tian 2013, Kultti 
and Mauring 2014, and Godenhielm and 
Kultti 2015).
In another application, Lester (2011) intro-
duces semi-directed search:  some buyers, 
called locals, are informed and direct their 
search to sellers posting favorable terms; 
others, called tourists, are uninformed and 
search randomly. He also has entry by sell-
ers. In a large market, equilibrium can have 
two types of sellers: local shops that post low 
prices to attract the informed; and tourist 
shops that exploit the uninformed. However, 
if the fraction of informed buyers is high, no 
tourist shops open. He also analyzes finite 
markets, but only under a parameter restric-
tion that guarantees no tourist shops open, 
so only one price is posted. Recently, Huang 
(2016) makes progress on relaxing this at 
least for  n s = 2 . He shows there is a unique 
equilibrium, and it has sellers randomizing 
over  p ∈  { p 1 ,  p 2 , …} ⊂  [c, u] .
The setup is useful for studying changes 
in information. Lester (2011) shows that 
increasing the fraction of informed buy-
ers can increase or decrease prices, 
 depending on parameters. This is contrary to 
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 conventional wisdom and to several papers 
that say prices fall when consumers are bet-
ter informed (Salop and Stiglitz 1977, Varian 
1980, Burdett and Judd 1983,  Stahl 1989). 
However, his result requires finite num-
bers, as the fraction of informed buyers does 
not affect prices with a continuum. Gomis-
Porqueras, Julien, and Wang (2017) pursue 
this when the number of informed buyers 
is endogenized by costly advertising. They 
show more information can raise prices even 
in large markets. Bethune, Choi, and Wright 
(2020) also show more information can raise 
or lower prices in large markets in monetary 
economies. Intuitively, if buyers’ bargaining 
power is low at tourist shops, they get more 
from a marginal dollar at local shops. With 
better information, the fraction of local shops 
rises, so buyers bring more money, and then 
sellers raise prices.27
Let us now return to Coles and Eeckhout 
(2003), by allowing sellers to post  p Q 
where  Q is the number of buyers that show 
up. As in the  2 × 2 market, indeterminacy 
obtains. However, Selcuk (2012) per-
turbs the environment by having risk-
averse buyers, so  V b = EU( S b 
Q
 ), where 
 S b 
Q
 =  (u −  p Q ) / Q is buyers’ surplus 
when  Q buyers show up. He shows that 
U ″ < 0 eliminates the indeterminacy: 
there is a unique equilibrium, and it fea-
tures  p Q = p  ∀ Q . In particular, if  U (S) =  S a 
27 This is relevant because Ellison and Ellison (2005), 
for example, say “evidence from the Internet … challenged 
the existing search models, because we did not see the tre-
mendous decrease in prices and price dispersion that many 
had predicted.” Similarly, according to Baye, Morgan, and 
Scholten (2006), “Reductions in information costs over the 
past century have neither reduced nor eliminated the lev-
els of price dispersion observed.” As the discussion in the 
text indicates, not all search models predict that prices fall 
with information, and it is even more obvious that price 
dispersion need not fall with information: when the frac-
tion of informed buyers is  0 or  1 , we are in a pure random 
or directed search world, and there is no dispersion; when 
the fraction is between  0 and  1 there is price dispersion; so 
dispersion is non-monotone in information.
with  a ∈  (0, 1) , in a market with  n =  n b / n s 
all sellers post
 p =  
 (1 −  e −n − n e −n−1 ) u + an e −n c   ________________________ 
1 −  e −n − n e −n−1 + an e −n 
 . 
Notice  ∂ p / ∂ a < 0 , and  p → u as  a → 0 . 
Also notice that  a = 1 implies  p is the same 
as (45) from proposition 5. Risk aversion 
seems an important extension to many appli-
cations of directed search, some of which are 
discussed below.
In fact, posting a contingent  p Q is still 
restrictive—why can’t buyers make or 
receive transfers even if they do not get 
served? Again, one might make assumptions 
to preclude this, but suppose we allow it. As 
in Jacquet and Tan (2012), for any mecha-
nism in a general class, the outcome can be 
implemented by having a buyer who gets 
the good pay  p and having others that show 
up pay  ϕ , which can be positive or nega-
tive. If  ϕ = p − u then buyers are fully 
insured: their payoff is the same whether or 
not they get served. Jacquet and Tan (2012) 
show that when buyers are risk averse there 
is a unique equilibrium and it features full 
insurance,  ϕ = p − u . One might say this 
provides strategic foundation for the market 
utility approach.
Returning to risk neutrality, Geromichalos 
(2012) explores several additional extensions 
in  n b ×  n s markets. First, he gives sellers the 
capacity to each serve up to  κ customers, 
and post mechanisms announcing the num-
ber they will serve, which cannot exceed  κ 
but could be less. He also allows  p Q to be 
contingent on the queue of buyers that show 
up, and allows payments from those who 
get served and those who do not. As in the 
previous paragraph,  it suffices to consider 
mechanisms where buyers that get served 
pay  p while buyers that show up but do not 
get served pay  ϕ . He then shows that in a 
particular sense, this does not matter in large 
markets—it is payoff equivalent to have 
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 sellers simply post one price, as in the base-
line model.
To illustrate his methods, let us set capac-
ity to  κ = 1 . Then, as shown in appendix F, 
in the limit as  n b ,  n s → ∞ with  n =  n b / n s 
fixed, equilibrium satisfies
(62)  (p − c) (1 −  e −n ) + nϕ 
   =  (u − c) (1 −  e −n − n e −n ) . 
This pins down  V s =  (u − c) (1 −  e −n − 
n e −n ) , the same as the outcome in proposi-
tion 5. Intuitively, any combination  (p, ϕ) 
satisfying (62) is payoff equivalent to the 
outcome when each seller simply posts  p . 
However, this needs to be reconciled with 
Virag (2011), who shows that for any market 
size, and the same type of mechanism  (p, ϕ) , 
there is always an equilibrium where sellers 
extract the entire surplus and market utility 
is  0 . Hence, it is not true that all equilibria 
converge to the limit in (62). The difference 
stems from the fact that Geromichalos (2012) 
excludes the possibility of infinite  ϕ : as Virag 
(2011)  makes clear, the convergence does 
apply if there is a bound on  ϕ , in which case 
the limit in (62) is valid.
Geromichalos (2014)  is a sequel on the 
Bertrand paradox—the idea that duopoly 
models often have an equilibrium where 
price equals marginal cost (which one might 
expect to require many sellers). A poten-
tial resolution discussed in the literature 
involves capacity constraints: if a firm cannot 
meet market demand, a rival charging more 
can still get customers. He argues that this is 
a special case of the idea that buyers’ payoffs 
can fall with realized demand at a given loca-
tion, and considers three examples: capacity 
constraints, congestion effects, and prices 
that depend on  Q (as in Coles and Eeckhout 
2003). These all resolve the paradox by mak-
ing buyer payoffs at a seller’s location fall 
with the number of buyers, so they may not 
all go to a seller when his  p is lower. While 
other papers typically specify demand exog-
enously, in directed search it is endogenous 
as a function of strategic behavior.
6. Heterogeneity and Sorting
6.1 A General Framework
Consider any two-sided market with 
types  t 1 and  t 2 on each side, with distribu-
tions  N 1 ( t 1 ) and  N 2 ( t 2 ) on supports   1 and   2 . 
This encompasses buyers and sellers with het-
erogeneous valuations or costs, workers and 
firms with heterogeneous productivity, and 
a general theory of partnership formation 
when agents have heterogeneous attributes. 
The type distributions are fixed for now, but 
can be determined by entry. Also, we focus 
mainly on the case where types are realized 
before decisions are made, they could also 
be realized after meetings.
Each agent from side 1 posts a mech-
anism  s ∈  , including all the infor-
mation side 2 can see. With pure price 
posting,  s = p and   =  ℝ + , while if 
side 1 also states his type then  s =  (p,  t 1 ) 
and   =  ℝ + ×   1 , where for notational con-
venience he can state any  t 1 ∈   1 , but when 
types are observable we assign payoff  − ∞ 
to lying (merely to reduce notation). Richer 
mechanisms include auctions, where agents 
in meetings have actions like bidding, and 
then an action for side  i is  a i ∈   i . We 
assume mechanisms can be ordered, and 
for side 1 let  n 1 (s,  a 1 ,  t 1 ) be the mass of types 
weakly below  t 1 posting  s or lower, and who 
play action  a 1 or lower if matched. With a 
slight abuse of notation, let  n 1 (s) be the mar-
ginal, the mass posting  s or lower. Similarly, 
distributions for side 2 indicate where they 
direct their search  and what they do if 
matched. Then the equilibrium concept is 
based on the theory of large games (Mas-
Colell 1984), where an individual’s payoff is 
determined by his behavior, and the distri-
bution of others’ behavior as described by  n 1 
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and  n 2 , but not on the behavior of any other 
individual.
As applied to competitive search by 
Eeckhout and Kircher (2010b) and Peters 
(2010), a key variable is tightness in a sub-
market with mechanism  s , determined on the 
equilibrium path by the ratio of side 2 to side 
1 agents in this submarket. It has to be consis-
tent with actual play. If a submarket attracts 
a mass of agents on both sides,  n (s) captures 
the ratio. But even when these masses shrink 
to zero, as is often the case with a contin-
uum of types, this ratio  n (s) = d n 2 (s) / d n 1 
(s) still remains well-defined using standard 
measure theory.28 Other key variables are the 
set of types on side 1 posting any  s , and the 
set on side 2 searching for  s . Let  ϕ i ( t i ,  a i ; s) 
be the distribution of types from side  i play-
ing action  a i in submarket  s . On the equi-
librium path this has to be consistent with 
actual play  n i (s,  a i ,  t i ) , more precisely with its 
conditional distribution given  s. The func-
tions  ϕ 1 ,  ϕ 2 , and  n are on the equilibrium 
path almost everywhere uniquely deter-
mined by the trading strategies  n 1 and  n 2 , 
but off equilibrium we have to make addi-
tional assumptions, as discussed below.
In sum, in addition to his own type, an 
agent cares about these objects in a submar-
ket: the probability of trade, the distribu-
tion of types on the other side, and payoffs 
within matches. These depend on his choice 
of  s and  a i , the expected number of other 
traders determined by  n , and the distribu-
tion of types and actions of other traders 
28 The ratio  n (s) = d n 2 (s) / d n 1 (s) is called the Radon–
Nikodym derivative. It builds on the idea that for any 
subset   ′ ⊆  the integral  ∫ s∈  ′  
 
 n (s) d n 1 (s) is the same 
as the associated number of side 2 agents searching for 
 s ∈   ′ ,  ∫ s∈   ′  
 
 d n 2 (s) . It simply extends the idea of a ratio if 
we have finite measures of types at a given  s and extends it 
to environments where one obtains a mass of agents only 
if one integrates over markets. Since it is never optimal to 
post an  s that attracts no one, we assume  supp ( n 1 (s) ) is 
a subset of  supp ( n 2 (s) ) , where  supp ( n 1 (s) ) is the support 
of  n i , and this makes the Radon–Nikodym derivative well 
defined.
 determined by  ϕ . Consider type  t i from side  i 
in a submarket with mechanism  s , expect-
ing tightness  n and distribution  ϕ . Denote 
his probability of trade by  α ̃ i (s,  a i ,  t i ; n, ϕ) . 
His payoff in a pair  t =  ( t 1 ,  t 2 ) , given 
 a =  ( a 1 ,  a 2 ) , is  v i (s, a, t) , and his payoff from 
not trading is  v 
¯i
 (s, a, t) . The expected payoff 
is
(63)  V i (s,  a i ,  t i ; n, ϕ) 
    =  α ̃ i (s,  a i ,  t i ; n, ϕ) E  v i (s, a, t) 
 +  [1 −  α ̃ i (s,  a i ,  t i ; n, ϕ) ] E  v ¯i (s, a, t) 
where expectations are with respect to  ϕ on 
the other side of the market.
As elsewhere in this survey, off 
equilibrium is tied to the notion of  subgame 
perfection for side 2. Let the market utility 
 U ( t 2 )   be the supremum of  V 2 (s,  a 2 ,  t 2 ; n, ϕ)    
over  s and  a 2 . If  n (s) > 0 we impose the 
market utility assumption, requiring that 
only those agents who can attain their 
market utility are believed to trade.29 Our 
setup is a signaling game for side 1 if their 
type is unknown, and we only require that 
agents believe that play is in undominated 
strategies.30
Equilibrium is defined as a distribution 
of strategies—what to post and where to 
search—plus tightness and distributions 
in every submarket. To make this precise, 
let  supp ( n i ) be the support of  n i , let  s 0 be a 
fictitious mechanism with  0 utility (the out-
side option), and let   0 =  ∪  { s 0 } be the 
set of mechanisms plus this.
DEFINITION 1: Equilibrium is a list of 
functions  ⟨  n 1 ,  n 2 , n,  ϕ 1 ,  ϕ 2 , U ⟩ such that:
29 Thus,  n (s) > 0 implies the support of  ϕ 2 ( t 2 ,  a 2 ; s) is 
non-empty and includes only  ( t 2 ,  a 2 ) ∈   2 ×   2 subject 
to  V 2 (s,  a 2 ,  t 2 ; n, ϕ) = U ( t 2 ) .
30 Thus, the support of beliefs  ϕ 1  does not allow combi-
nations  ( t 1 ,  a 1 ; s)  such that  ( a 1 , s)  is strictly dominated for  t 1 
whenever there is  ( a 1 ′; s) that is not dominated for some  t 1 ′.
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1. (maximization)  V i (s,  a i ,  t i ; n, ϕ) ≥  V i ( s ′ , 
 a i ′ ,  t i ; n, ϕ)  ∀ (s,  a i ,  t i ) ∈ supp ( n i ) and 
 ( s ′ ,  a i ′ ) ∈   0 ×   i ;
2. (consistency)  ϕ and  n are consistent 
with  n 1 and  n 2 on their support;
3. (perfection) The market utility assump-
tion holds and beliefs are on undomi-
nated strategies;
4. (feasibility)  ∀   i ′ ⊆   i ,
 ∫ ×  i ×   i ′  
 
 d n i (s,  a i ,  t i ) ≤  ∫    i ′  
 
 d N i ( t i ) ,  
 with  equality if  max  (s, a i ) ∈×  i   V i (s,  a i ,  t i ; 
n, ϕ) > 0 for almost all  t i ∈    i ′ . 
The first condition says that agents par-
ticipate in submarkets that maximize their 
payoffs given their beliefs. The second says 
beliefs are consistent with strategies. The 
third captures off-equilibrium behavior. The 
inequality in the fourth says that the measure 
of agents in submarkets can never exceed the 
measure in the population, but could be less 
if some agents abstain from trade; if there 
are strictly positive returns it is suboptimal to 
abstain and the condition holds with equal-
ity. There is no entry here, but with slight 
modification one can add it, or can change 
the setup so that the type of side 2 is only 
drawn after the meeting.31
6.2 Sorting
As a first concrete example, consider 
a bilateral meeting technology and price 
posting, as in sections 2–4, where types 
are known ex ante and observable, and 
31 Entry by side 1 at cost  k ( t 1 ) , for example, simply 
requires  V 1 = k ( t 1 ) (Acemoglu and Shimer 1999 a, b ; Shi 
2001; Eeckhout and Kircher 2010b). Drawing types of 
side 2 after matching means the distribution in each sub-
market is the unconditional distribution, and maximization 
means side 2 seeks the highest  V 2 over possible realizations 
of  t 2 (Peters and Severinov 1997).
a mechanism lists a price, the type of 
agent 1, and the type of agent 2 that type 
1 aims to attract. In our general notation, 
 s =  (p,  t 1 ,  t 2 ) ∈  =  ℝ + ×   1 ×   2 . There 
are no actions: in a meeting agents just 
trade at the posted price. This is relatively 
tractable since trading probabilities only 
depend on  n and types are observed, imply-
ing the function  α ̃ i can be replaced by  α i (n) , 
with  α 1 (n) = α (n) and  α 2 (n) = α (n) / n , as 
in the baseline model. Trade yields surplus 
 S ( t 1 ,  t 2 ) that depends on types, while no trade 
yields  0 . Let  S i ( t 1 ,  t 2 ) be the surplus of side  i . 
One can show that side 1 agents reveal their 
types and are approached only by the desired 
types from side 2.
Hence, we can treat beliefs  ϕ 1 and  ϕ 2 as 
degenerate, and
(64)   V 1 [ (p,  t 1 ,  t 2 ) ,  t 1 ; n, ϕ] 
   =  α 1 (n) [ S 1 ( t 1 ,  t 2 ) + p] , 
while something similar holds for type  2 
except  p enters negatively. The maximization 
condition in the equilibrium definition can 
be rewritten such that side  1 maximizes (64) 
under the constraint that side 2 gets market 
utility  U ( t 2 ) ,
  max 
p,n, t 2 
α (n) [ S 1 ( t 1 ,  t 2 ) + p]  
subject to
    
α (n)  _n [ S 2 ( t 1 ,  t 2 ) − p] = U ( t 2 ) . 
Using the constraint to eliminate  p we 
get  max n, t 2  α (n) S ( t 1 ,  t 2 ) − nU ( t 2 ) . The differ-
ence from earlier applications is that  t 2 is an 
argument of  U ( t 2 ) , but one can show  U ( t 2 ) is 
increasing, and the solution is described by 
the FOCs with respect to both  n and  t 2 . 
This setup has been studied in Shi (2001) 
for urn-ball matching and in Eeckhout and 
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Kircher (2010 b ) for general matching.32 A 
general treatment is provided in Chade, 
Eeckhout, and Smith (2017). An insight 
worth emphasizing is that a completely sym-
metric economy with positive assortative 
matching has a constant queue length every-
where, which may be surprising, as higher 
types on side 1 are more valuable and should 
be matched more frequently. But they trade 
with higher types on side 2, and this cancels 
the effect. The general relationship between 
prices and probabilities can be complex. 
When either the type distributions or the 
payoff functions are not symmetric, the 
queue length changes according to differ-
ential equations derived from the FOC and 
feasibility, which capture both the relative 
scarcity of types and the relative importance 
in value generation. Depending on which 
side reaps the surplus, prices may increase 
or decrease with type. Since both can be 
varied at the same time, it is easy to get 
higher prices associated with higher trading 
probabilities when types are heterogeneous.
This discussion relies on higher types trad-
ing with each other. If  S has CRS, that occurs 
if the inverse elasticity of substitution in pro-
duction outweighs the elasticity of substitu-
tion in the matching function (Eeckhout and 
Kircher 2010 b ), meaning complementarities 
in production are stronger than supermod-
ular, the usual condition in sorting models. 
The reason is that under weak supermodu-
larity,  S =  t 1 +  t 2 , it is optimal to raise the 
trading probabilities of high types by pairing 
them with many agents from the other side, 
and the least-cost way to do so is to pair them 
32 Davoodalhosseini (2015) adds entry and private infor-
mation about 2’s type. See also Jerez (2014) and Mortensen 
and Wright (2002), where the latter is a dynamic model 
with endogenous flows into the market, but only considers 
separable payoffs. On multilateral meetings, see Shimer 
(2005); Julien, Kennes, and King (2005); and Albrecht, 
Gautier, and Vroman (2014).
with low types on the other side, who do not 
mind waiting as much.33
7. Private Information with Bilateral 
Meetings
Next, consider private information 
about types, such as workers with better 
(or worse)  knowledge than their employ-
ers  about skills, or sellers with better (or 
worse)  knowledge than buyers about their 
goods. We focus for now on the case where 
agents meet in pairs; multilateral meetings 
are covered in section 8.
7.1 Match-Specific Models
Faig and Jerez (2005) study static goods 
markets where buyers have private informa-
tion about their valuation, Guerrieri (2008) 
analyzes labor markets where workers have 
private information about the disutility of 
work, and Moen and Rosén (2011) study 
steady state in labor markets where workers 
have private information about match qual-
ity and effort. Among other issues, they study 
efficiency. In the baseline models analyzed 
above, equilibria are typically constrained 
efficient, but this is less clear with private 
information. Faig and Jerez (2005) show 
that equilibrium is constrained efficient if 
the shock is realized after the match and not 
otherwise. Guerrieri (2008) shows that even 
in the first case equilibrium is inefficient 
outside the steady state (see also Guerrieri 
2007).
Consider a version of Guerrieri (2008) by 
introducing match-specific private informa-
tion in the goods market of subsection 2.1. 
33 The ease of these sorting conditions is due to the fact 
that each type on one side only meets a single type from 
the other side within a submarket. This has advantages for 
tractability, but does not allow someone to attribute output 
or wages either to the worker or the firm, as they are always 
matched perfectly (Eeckhout and Kircher 2011); but see 
subsection 8.1.
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There is a unit mass of homogeneous sellers 
who can produce one unit at cost  c ; buyers 
get utility  u randomly drawn from  F (u) with 
support   , privately observed after match-
ing. The mass of active sellers is pinned 
down by entry at cost  k . Each seller that 
enters posts a contract where, due to the rev-
elation principle, it is from the set of incen-
tive compatible, individually rational, direct 
mechanisms   . Thus  s  :   ↦  [0, 1] ×  ℝ + 
specifies a menu of trading probabilities 
 e (u) and transfers  p (u) for a buyer reporting 
utility  u . Buyers observe posted contracts 
and decide where to go, leading to submar-
ket tightness  n (s) . A buyer’s utility realiza-
tion leads to a decision to trade or not. The 
ad interim utility of a buyer who matches 
in submarket  s , draws  u and reports  u ̃ is 
 v (s, u,  u ̃ ) = e ( u ̃ ) [u − p ( u ̃ ) ] , and  s ∈  is 
incentive compatible and individually ratio-
nal if
(65)  v (s, u, u) ≥ v (s, u,  u ̃ ) ∀ u,  u ̃ ∈  ,
(66)  v (s, u, u) ≥ 0 ∀ u ∈ . 
Equilibrium can be characterized by buyers’ 
market utility  U , the set of posted mecha-
nisms   P ∈  , and tightness  n (s) defined 
on   , such that:34
a) sellers’ maximization and free 
entry:  ∀ s =  [e (u) , p (u) ] u∈ ∈  ,
(67)  α [n (s) ] ∫ u∈ 
 
 e (u) [p (u) − c] dF (u) − k
   ≤ 0, 
 with equality if  s ∈   P ;
34 This definition is a special case of the one in sub-
section 6.1. Here, incentive compatibility ensures sellers’ 
beliefs about buyers’ action place all mass on truthtelling. 
And since types are drawn ex post,  ϕ (t) = F (t) is indepen-
dent of  s , where  u = t , to ensure consistency. Feasibility 
is not stated explicitly, since free entry ensures sellers enter 
to satisfy the desired market tightness.
b) buyers’ maximization: 
  ∀ s =  [e (u) , p (u) ] u∈ ∈  ,
(68)  
α [n (s) ]  _
n (s) 
  ∫ u∈ 
 
 e (u) [u − p (u) ] dF (u) ≤ U, 
 and  n (s) ≥ 0 with complementarity 
slackness, where
   U =  max 
s
  
α [n (s) ]  _
n (s) 
 
 × ∫ u∈ 
 
 e (u) [u − p (u) ] dF (u) . 
One can show that equilibrium can be 
characterized by maximizing buyer’s payoff 
subject to (65), (66), and entry. Appendix F 
reduces the dimensionality of the constraints 
using methods from mechanism design (e.g., 
Myerson 1981). Then one can show equilib-
rium is unique, and only one type of contract 
[e (u) , p (u) ] is posted, where the nondecreas-
ing trading probability  e (u) and tightness 
 n (u) solve
 U =  max 
e (∙) ,n
 
α (n)  _n ∫ u∈ 
 
 e (u) (u − c) dF (u) 
 subject to
 α (n) ∫ u∈ 
 
 e (u) [u −  
1 − F (u)  _
f (u) 
 ] dF (u) ≥ k. 
Entry by sellers implies buyers get the entire 
surplus. Equilibrium maximizes the surplus, 
subject to buyers getting the information 
rents required for truthful revelation. Only 
buyers that draw  u ≥  u ˆ trade, with  u ˆ endog-
enous. In this static environment equilib-
rium is constrained efficient; as mentioned, 
in a dynamic extension out of steady state, it 
is generically not constrained efficient.
7.2 Individual-Specific Models
Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010); 
Shao (2014); Chang (2018); Guerrieri and 
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Shimer (2014, 2018); Chen, Doyle, and 
Gonzalez (2015); Williams (2019); and 
Davoodalhosseini (2019) all consider screen-
ing problems à la Akerlof (1970). Consider 
Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010), a 
static environment with, in their language, 
homogenous principals and heterogeneous 
agents. Types are private information and 
have common value for principals and agents. 
Principals post contracts, and agents decide 
where to search given beliefs. Guerrieri, 
Shimer, and Wright (2010) show that there 
exists a fully separating equilibrium, and it is 
the unique equilibrium.35
Consider an extension of the model in sub-
section 2.1 with ex ante homogenous buyers 
and heterogeneous sellers. Buyers (side 1) can 
enter at cost  k , sellers (side 2) can produce an 
indivisible good at  0 cost, where a fraction  π h 
produces high quality and  π l = 1 −  π h pro-
duces low quality, with respective values to 
buyers  v ̃1 h and  v ̃1 l <  v ̃1 h. Quality is private 
information to sellers before trade. If a seller 
does not trade he gets  v ̃2 h or  v ̃2 l , depending 
on quality, where  v ̃2 t <  v ̃1 t ,  t ∈  {l, h} , so 
there are always gains from trade. Buyers in 
the market post  s ∈  =  [0, 1] ×  핉 + , and 
sellers choose where to search. A contract 
 s =  (e, p) specifies a trading probabil-
ity  e and a transfer  p , but the same out-
come obtains if buyers post menus  [ ( e l ,  p l ) , 
 ( e h ,  p h ) ] .
Any  s is associated with a submarket 
with tightness  n (s) and a fraction  ϕ (t; s) of 
type  t sellers, with  ϕ (l; s) + ϕ (h; s) = 1 , so 
the probability a seller matches is  α [n (s) ] , 
and the probability a buyer matches with a 
seller of type  t is  α [n (s) ] ϕ (t; s) / n (s) . For  s 
=  (e, p) define
  v 1 (s, t) = e ( v ̃1 t − p)  
35 This constitutes  an alternative solution to the 
 nonexistence problem in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976); 
see Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) for the intuition 
and related work.
and
   v 2 (s, t) = ep +  (1 − e)  v ̃2 t , 
where  v 2 (s, t) and  v 1 (s, t) are the payoffs in 
submarket  s conditional on meetings.
In this setting equilibrium can be defined 
by a pair of sellers’ market utilities  [ U l ,  U h ] , 
tightness  n (s) , and market composition  ϕ (t; s) , 
both defined over   , a CDF  Z (s) , and a set of 
posted contracts   P ∈  , satisfying:36
a) buyers’ maximization and free entry,
 
α [n (s) ]  _
n (s) 




 ϕ (  j; s)  v 1 (s, t) − k ≤ 0 
  ∀ s ∈  , with equality if  s ∈   P ;
b) sellers’ maximization,
  α [n (s) ]  v 2 (s, t) +  {1 − α [n (s) ] }  v ̃2 t ≤  U t 
  ∀ s ∈  and  t ∈  {l, h} , with equality 
if  n (s) < ∞ and  ϕ ( j; s) > 0 , where
    U t =  max 
s∈
 α [n (s) ]  v 2 (s, t) 
 +  {1 − α [n (s) ] }  v ̃2 t ; 
c) and feasibility,
  ∫   P  
 
 ϕ (  j; s) n (s) dZ (s) ≤  π j 
  ∀ j , with equality if  U t > 0 .
36 This is again a special case of the definition in subsec-
tion 6.1. The first two conditions come from maximization 
coupled with perfection. Notice the second one requires 
maximization on and off equilibrium: if a buyer expects a 
seller of a given type to search for a given contract, even off 
equilibrium, it must be weakly optimal for that seller to do 
so. This delivers uniqueness. In contrast to subsection 7.1, 
we must specify feasibility here because entry of buyers 
alone is not sufficient to ensure the right market tightness 
per type.
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Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) 
prove that equilibrium is fully separating and 
characterized by two simple problems: any 
seller  t ∈  {l, h} chooses a contract  s and 
faces tightness  n , where  (s, n) solves
(69)  U t =  max 




α (n)  _n  v 1 (s, t) ≥ k 
and
α (n)  v 2 (s,  t ′ ) +  [1 − α (n) ]  v ̃2  t ′ ≤  U t ′
for  t ′ < t. 
As might be expected with adverse selection 
(e.g., based on Mirrlees 1971), individual 
rationality is binding for low-quality sell-
ers, incentive compatibility is binding for 
high-quality sellers, and equilibrium features 
less trade in the submarket with high qual-
ity. Equilibrium is not generally efficient, 
although taxes can correct the inefficiencies 
(Davoodalhosseini 2019).
Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) study dynamic 
markets with heterogenous assets. Intuitively, 
by selling in a “less liquid”  market, sellers 
convey that their assets have higher value. 
They use the setup to analyze financial cri-
ses, fire sales, and flight to quality. Guerrieri 
and Shimer (2018) introduce another dimen-
sion of private information, albeit in a static 
setting. Namely, investors do not know the 
quality of assets nor the impatience of sellers. 
This generates multiple equilibria with inter-
esting efficiency implications. Chang (2018) 
also analyzes a model with two dimensions of 
private information, but collapses them into 
one, avoiding multiple equilibria. She covers 
the case where assets that are more valuable 
to buyers do not necessarily have higher 
average quality, generating semi-pooling 
equilibria.
These papers study screening, as the unin-
formed post contracts. Delacroix and Shi 
(2013) study signaling. Davoodalhosseini 
(2012) has private information, where some 
buyers are informed and others are not 
(as in random search models going back 
to Williamson and Wright 1994). Directed 
search is a promising approach to infor-
mation frictions in labor, asset, and other 
markets, and more research on both with 
screening and signaling would be wel-
come.  Especially for asset markets, this 
could connect well with the theories of 
liquidity in section 4.
8. Meetings and Mechanisms
8.1 Private Information with Multilateral 
Meetings
We now merge individual- and match-spe-
cific private information, focusing mostly 
on one-sided heterogeneity. There is a dis-
tribution  N 2 ( t 2 ) with support  [0,  t ¯ 2 ] on side 
2, and a mass  N 1 of homogeneous agents 
on side  1, again with side 1 called sellers 
and side 2 buyers. Since types only refer to 
buyers, we sometimes drop the subscript. 
We also stick to private valuations: the value 
from a match is  S 2 (t) = t > 0 for buyers 
and  S 1 (t) = 0 for sellers. A buyer’s type  t is 
private information, and we focus on sellers 
using mechanisms that do not specify types, 
like auctions. In this environment the litera-
ture is mainly concerned with the case where 
payoffs can be replicated using direct reve-
lation mechanisms: in a meeting, the buyer 
reports  t and payoffs are delivered as a func-
tion of the report.37
37 It is also possible for buyers to have more informa-
tion than their own type, for example, which mechanisms 
are posted (McAfee 1993, Epstein and Peters 1999, Peters 
1999).
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Here is the issue: with bilateral meetings, 
it is standard that sellers do not need to post 
anything more than a price (e.g., Riley and 
Zeckhauser 1983); with multilateral meet-
ings, under mild assumptions a seller should 
run an auction with reserve price  p 
¯
that 
generally depends on the type distribution. 
A  priori one might think it is inefficient if 
sellers extract rents via reserve prices, since 
it is possible that all the buyers that show up 
have  t > 0 but  t <  p 
¯
. Are there gains from 
trade left on the table? Extracting rents via 
standard price posting, as in previous sec-
tions, does not resolve this because it does 
not generally deliver the good to the buyer 
with highest valuation. In fact, the results 
depend on how agents meet. With ran-
dom matching  p 
¯
> 0 would be the seller’s 
 revenue-maximizing choice, which reduces 
to the well-studied problem of a monopolist 
seller.
In McAfee (1993), Peters (1997a), and 
Peters and Severinov (1997), each buyer 
directs his search toward mechanisms they 
most prefer, with multilateral meetings and 
coordination frictions as in section 5. Given  n , 
with probability  P 0 (n) =  e −n a seller gets no 
buyers, with probability  P 1 (n) = n  e −n he 
gets one, and with  l buyers  P l (n) follows the 
Poisson formula (note the multilateral nature 
of meetings sets this apart from section 7). 
They show that restricting attention to stan-
dard auctions with reserve prices is without 
loss of generality for an individual seller, 
independent of the mechanisms posted by 
others. Hence we have sellers use auctions 
with reserve prices, and refer to the mecha-
nism by  p 
¯
, with no further actions by sellers.
Using the notation from section 6, for 
each buyer let  a 2 be his bid. In a first price 
auction, his payoff conditional on trading is 
 v 2 (s,  a 2 , t) = t −  a 2 , and the seller’s payoff 
is  v 1 (s,  a 2 , t) =  a 2 if  a 2 ≥  p 
¯
as specified 
in  s , and the payoff from no trade is  0 . Now 
 ϕ 2 (t,  a 2 ;  p ¯)
 is the probability a buyer who 
directs his search to  p 
¯
has a type weakly below  t 
and bids weakly less than  a 2 . Let  ϕ 2 ( a 2 ;  p ¯
,   2 ) 
be the corresponding marginal probability 
that any type approaching mechanism  p 
¯
bids 
weakly below  a 2 . Equivalently, let the prob-
ability any buyer bids weakly above  a 2 be 
 ϕ ˆ 2 ( a 2 ;  p ¯
,   2 ) . The adjusted queue of buy-
ers who pay at least  p 
¯
is  n ϕ ˆ 2 ( p ¯
;  p 
¯
,   2 ) . 
The probability of trade for a buyer is 
given by  α ̃ 1 = 1 −  P 0 [n ϕ ˆ 2 ( p ¯
;  p 
¯
,   2 ) ] . 
For buyers the probability of trade 
is  0 if  a 2 <  p 
¯
;  otherwise it is  α ̃ 2 ( p ¯
,  a 2 , t; n, ϕ) 
=  P 0 [n ϕ ˆ 2 ( p ¯
;  p 
¯
,   2 ) ] , assuming that  ϕ does 
not have a mass point at  a 2 (see Kim and 
Kircher 2015).
Peters and Severinov (1997) start with 
finite numbers, then take the limit, as in sec-
tion 5. There are two cases: (i) buyers draw 
value  t before deciding where to search, 
or (ii) they draw  t after meeting a seller. In 
equilibrium, in the limit as the market gets 
large, case (i) implies sellers post a reserve 
price equal to their outside option,  p 
¯
= 0 . 
This validates the finding in McAfee (1993), 
who considers a finite economy but ignores 
market power, as discussed in section 5. 
Peters and Severinov (1997) conjecture that 
in case (ii) sellers post  p 
¯
> 0 , but the logic 
of their argument reviewed below does not 
apply, and a careful analysis in Albrecht, 
Gautier, and Vroman (2012) shows  p 
¯
= 0 
in that case as well.38 They also show this 
with second price auctions, for both cases 
(i) and (ii), in large markets, and they show 
that entry by sellers is efficient. It is inter-
esting that a single price of  p = 0 gener-
ates efficiency along two margins: entry and 
38 The efficiency of the reserve price is shown by Julien, 
Kennes, and King (2000) in large markets with homoge-
neous agents. With heterogeneous sellers, Julien, Kennes, 
and King (2005) show that a market where all sellers use 
efficient reserve price induces buyers to make efficient 
choices across sellers, even with finite numbers. Taking 
all strategic considerations into account, this carries over 
to  2 × 2 markets (Julien, Kennes, and King 2002), but 
not  n b ×  n s markets (Kim and Kircher 2015).
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 efficiency within meetings. With a price 
of  0   it is never the case that all buyers at a 
given seller have  t > 0 but  t <  p 
¯
. Even 
though buyers are locked in at the time of 
bidding, the fact that they choose where to 
search based on posted  p 
¯
dissipates sellers’ 
monopoly power—they still earn rents due 
to the frictions, but the usual monopoly con-
siderations vanish.
The main driving force behind Peters and 
Severinov’s argument for case (i) is illus-
trated as follows: Suppose all sellers offer 
the same  p 
¯
> 0 . Then any seller trades with 
probability less than  1 due to frictions. Now 
a deviating seller posting  p 
¯
− ε attracts addi-
tional buyers, those with type above  p 
¯
− ε 
for whom the original  p 
¯
is too high. In a large 
market the deviant seller’s trading probabil-
ity jumps, since there are many such buyers, 
making the deviation profitable. Hence, the 
only possibility in a large market is  p 
¯
= 0 . 
Despite the fact that search is directed, in 
equilibrium all offers are identical and buy-
ers pick sellers at random. This coincides 
with the planner’s outcome, since the most 
trade occurs if buyers visit sellers at random, 
if the good goes to the highest type, without 
precluding anyone outright from the market. 
Interestingly, even though in case (i) there is 
ex ante information that can be used when 
selecting where to search, the efficient equi-
librium outcome (random search and where 
the good goes to the highest bidder) does 
not use that information. Thus, even in the 
less informative case (ii) the same outcome 
occurs. Competitive search is efficient, inde-
pendent of when types are drawn, which is 
especially nice because the efficient mech-
anism is so simple, with  p 
¯
not depending on 
the distribution of  t .
The randomness of search here contrasts 
with section 7, but this can be explained with 
two types: high types outbid low types and for 
them, random search maximizes the number 
of matches, due to the well-know concavity 
of the urn-ball matching  function. Similarly, 
random search maximizes the total number 
of matches of all types. Therefore, total effi-
ciency is achieved (see also subsection 8.2). 
When sellers are heterogeneous in costs 
and buyers know their type before search-
ing, search is no longer random. Rather, 
higher-type buyers choose a higher cost cut-
off seller and trade randomly with all types 
where costs are better. Higher buyer types 
have a higher cutoff, meaning negative sort-
ing (Peters 1997 a ), similar to subsection 6.2, 
but now sorting is imperfect because a buyer 
not only trades with the cutoff seller but with 
all higher types. This corresponds to the 
planner’s outcome where the chance of trad-
ing is increased by spreading these buyers 
across sellers.
The result obtains whether buyers only 
observe the reserve price, or also seller type, 
since given  p 
¯
they do not care about the lat-
ter. It also obtains if they cannot see  p 
¯
, given 
a penalty for lying. Sellers accept the high-
est bid unless it is below cost, and buyers 
do not submit bids below cost. Effectively 
this is like a first-price auction with reserve 
price equal to cost (Julien, Kennes, and 
King 2005). Finally, even if there is no pen-
alty for lying, and messages are cheap talk, 
there is an equilibrium where sellers truth-
fully reveal type (Kim and Kircher 2015).39 
This highlights the role of cheap talk with-
out commitment, as in housing and labor 
markets where advertised prices and wages 
may send messages but are typically not 
binding (Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman 
2016). Attaining full efficiency with cheap 
talk depends on details (Menzio 2007). With 
private values, the trading patterns in models 
39 It is important that buyers know the correct type  t 1 to 
know where to attempt to trade and what to bid. In a cheap-
talk environment sellers post only a message  s ∈   1 about 
their type, but there is no penalty for lying. The question 
is whether there is an equilibrium in which sellers send 
truthful messages in the first stage. Indeed it exists and 
attains the efficient sorting of the fully competitive model 
(Kim and Kircher 2015).
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with private  information or with observable 
types are identical: Shi (2002) and Shimer 
(2005) study settings in which sellers post a 
price and priority rule for each type and find 
that mixing types in a submarket is a robust 
outcome with urn-ball matching. They also 
study two-sided heterogeneity.
Mangin (2017) considers the relation-
ship between workers’ endogenous share 
of the surplus and the endogenous pro-
duction technology in a competitive search 
model with wages determined by auctions. 
Expected match output depends on tightness 
through a selection channel and a general-
ized Hosios condition for efficiency applies. 
Workers’ share of the surplus depends not 
only on tightness, and hence general eco-
nomic conditions, but also depends directly 
on the distribution of match-specific pro-
ductivities—the type distribution. In the 
limit as unemployment disappears, Mangin 
shows the firms’ share converges to the tail 
index of this distribution, which captures the 
fatness of its tails. The key parameter gov-
erning the surplus division is thus inherited 
from this distribution. Thus, competitive 
search delivers a deeper foundation for the 
link between factor prices and technology, 
which is simply assumed with competitive 
factor markets. Mangin and Julien (2021) 
show that the generalized Hosios condition 
applies in several other settings where the 
surplus depends on tightness, explaining the 
efficiency results in Albrecht, Gautier, and 
Vroman (2014).
With adverse selection, efficiency can fail 
if types are not observable. The inefficien-
cies can be reduced and market outcomes 
improved by restricting sellers to post 
prices (or equivalently, randomly choosing 
one buyer to trade with) relative to a mar-
ket with full commitment power (Gottardi, 
Tallon, and Ghirardato 2017). Kennes and 
Schiff (2008) assume sellers have private 
information about the quality of their goods 
and multilateral meetings. An intermediary 
verifying quality sells information to buyers 
and sells accreditation to sellers. This can be 
welfare improving or reducing. Again, there 
is more to do in this area. Julien and Roger 
(2016) introduce moral hazard, assuming a 
stochastic relationship between output and 
unobserved effort in with risk aversion but 
not limited liability (unlike Moen and Rosén 
2011). The unique equilibrium contract does 
not depend on the number of agents who show 
up and they get constrained efficiency on the 
intensive (effort) and extensive (entry) mar-
gins, given they allow transfers to agents who 
show up but are not selected, as in Jacquet 
and Tan (2012). Other work includes Lester, 
Visschers, and Wolthoff (2017), where sellers 
compete on posted asking prices and agents 
can trade immediately or wait for an auction, 
like on eBay, combining elements of optimal 
stopping models and competitive search.
8.2 Mechanism Design
There is a literature on mechanism design 
and auctions where competition for buyers 
is a nontrivial element, but less work on how 
the meeting process matters. In the private 
valuation case, with multilateral meetings, 
we saw competition for buyers results in a 
standard auction with reserve price equal to 
cost. This is simple, but raises concerns: why 
don’t sellers use two margins, one to attract 
buyers and one to guarantee that buyers 
who show up reveal their types? Why does 
competition stop at  p 
¯
= 0 price, rather 
than  p 
¯
< 0 , which attracts even more buy-
ers? Should there be an entry payment to 
attract buyers and a reserve price to select 
the best type? When does it suffice to 
have only an entry payment or simply post 
a price?
The general issue is to know how mech-
anism design is affected by the way agents 
meet. While this has not attracted much 
attention yet, we can review some advances 
in settings with ex ante private values for 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIX (March 2021)130
buyers as introduced at the beginning of 
the previous subsection  ( S 2 (t) = t and 
 S 1 (t) = 0, where buyer type  t is distrib-
uted on  [0, 1] ). But in contrast to this sub-
section, consider now a general meeting 
function  P l (n) instead of urn ball, follow-
ing Eeckhout and Kircher (2010a); Lester, 
Visschers, and Wolthoff (2015); and Cai, 
Gautier, and Wolthoff (2017, 2019). This 
is natural, for example, if each buyer 
approaches one seller but the latter seller 
only has  time to deal with a random sub-
set of  L buyers. If  L = 1 , this is a bilateral 
meeting technology; if  L = ∞ it is urn-ball; 
and other intermediate cases may be equally 
plausible.
To see how this affects the mech-
anism choice, as in Cai, Gautier, and 
Wolthoff  (2017, 2019), two observations 
are relevant: First, posting an optimal entry 
payment and a standard auction with a 
reserve price is at least as profitable as any 
direct revelation mechanism, so we can 
focus on a second price auction where buy-
ers pay an entry fee and then bid. Second, 
equilibrium is constrained efficient, which 
means the reserve price equals cost, and 
the surplus added across sellers is maxi-
mized. Consider a seller facing tightness  n 
and a cumulative distribution of buyer types 
 ϕ 2 (t) . The expected social surplus at this 
seller is




 ζ (n [1 −  ϕ 2 (t) ] , n) dt, 
where  ζ ( n ˆ , n) = 1 −  Σ l  P l (n)  (1 −  n ˆ / n) l rep-
resents the following: in a submarket with 
tightness  n of all buyers and a tightness  n ˆ 
of high-type buyers (e.g., those with types 
strictly above some  t) , the term  ζ ( n ˆ , n) rep-
resents the seller’s probability of meeting 
one of these high-type buyers. So the social 
surplus equals the integral over the chance 
of meeting a buyer with type above  t (see 
Cai, Gautier, and Wolthoff 2019).
It is optimal to pool all buyers into one 
market if  ζ ( n ˆ , n) is concave. To see this, 
suppose there is a unit measure of sellers 
in a submarket with  2  n ˆ a high-type buyers 
and  2  n a buyers in total, giving the relevant 
tightness. And suppose there is another unit 
measure of sellers in a submarket with  2  n ˆ b 
high-type buyers and  2  n b buyers in total. By 
(70), the surplus per seller is  t 
¯
ζ (2  n j , 2  n j ) + 
( ̄  t −  t ¯) ζ (2  n ˆ j , 2  n j ) with  j ∈  {a, b} , where the 
first term says that as long as the seller meets 
someone he creates at least value  t 
¯
, and the 
second says that if he meets a high type he 
creates additional  ̄  t −  t 
¯
. The total surplus 
sums over  j. Now contrast this with a setting 
in which buyers are assigned randomly. In 
this case we have a measure  2 of sellers that 
each generate surplus  t 
¯
ζ ( n a +  n b ,  n a +  n b ) + 
( ̄  t −  t ¯) ζ ( n ˆ a +  n ˆ b ,  n a +  n b ) . If  ζ is concave it is better to pool types in one market. The result 
holds more generally for arbitrary distri-
butions of types. If  ζ is not globally con-
cave, there are always type distributions for 
which segregation is desirable under mild 
conditions.
Suppose sellers can handle up to  L buy-
ers, where the resulting  ζ is not globally con-
cave for  L < ∞ , and the lack of concavity 
is more severe for small  L . Eeckhout and 
Kircher (2010 a ) show more constrained sell-
ers want to segregate buyer types into dif-
ferent submarkets, and since they can then 
infer type there is no need for complicated 
mechanisms (see also Auster and Gottardi 
2019). However, to ensure simple price post-
ing is optimal for any distribution of buyer 
types we need bilateral meetings—see Cai, 
Gautier, and Wolthoff (2017, 2019), who also 
show it is optimal for a seller that attracts  n 
to post auctions with a reserve price equal to 
cost and an entry fee  τ . One can show  τ = 0 
if  ζ 2 = 0 everywhere, a feature called invari-
ance (Lester et al. 2019). When this applies, 
it is optimal to pool, as competition between 
types is handled by the mechanism rather 
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than meetings. In sum, the meeting  process 
has many implications for mechanism choice, 
and we encourage more work on this.
9. Other Topics
9.1 The Nash Program
The quest for strategic foundations for axi-
omatic bargaining is dubbed the Nash pro-
gram (Binmore 1987).40 Competitive search 
provides an explicit description of a mar-
ket, with finite or infinite numbers, where 
 traders end up sharing the gains from trade 
in a way that can be interpreted in terms of 
generalized Nash, with bargaining powers 
and threat points determined by economic 
conditions. In an  n b ×  n s market, (45) gives  p 
as a weighted average of  c and  u , where the 
weight on  u is the probability a seller gets at 
least  2 buyers; in particular, in a  2 × 2 mar-
ket  p =  (u + c) / 2 is consistent with the 
original Nash solution. This provides an 
alternative to showing how generalized Nash 
is the limit of a non-cooperative game, with 
bargaining power and threat points deter-
mined by details of the game (Binmore, 
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986).
With axiomatic bargaining the parameter  θ 
is structural. With competitive search the sur-
plus shares are not generally constant, but 
depend on economic conditions. Ignoring 
that can be justified only in special cases—
for instance, Cobb–Douglas matching. Also, 
the shares generally vary across submarkets, 
which is important, because in markets with 
two-sided investments typically there is 
no single  θ that delivers  efficiency  (i.e., we 
40 “[As in] the microfoundations of macroeconomics, 
which aim to bring closer the two branches of economic 
theory, the Nash program is an attempt to bridge the gap 
between the two counterparts of game theory (cooperative 
and non-cooperative). This is accomplished by investi-
gating non-cooperative procedures that yield cooperative 
solutions as equilibrium outcomes” (Serrano 2005).
cannot satisfy multiple Hosios conditions 
with a one  θ ). With heterogeneity, when the 
expected surplus depends on market tight-
ness as in Mangin (2017) or Mangin and 
Julien (2021), agents’ share depends not 
only on tightness, but also on the type dis-
tribution. Competitive search allows agents 
to trade prices against both probabilities of 
trade and the expected surplus, ensuring 
agents receive a share that is commensurate 
with their contribution to both matching and 
surplus creation. Thus generating efficiency. 
Hence, competitive search can deliver effi-
ciency in these situations, so it not only pro-
vides microfoundations for sharing, it can 
dominate bargaining, but of course, this typ-
ically requires commitment.
9.2 Large Firms
Most of the literature on labor search, 
directed or otherwise, concentrates on 
jobs rather than firms:  each job is consid-
ered an entity unto itself without specify-
ing how they aggregate into firms. This is 
ill-suited for studying firm size or growth. 
Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2013) 
show that matching efficiency varies sub-
stantially, and linearly, with a firm’s growth 
rate. To understand this, a promising ave-
nue is to postulate that firms with  L work-
ers produce  f (L) , and can post  v vacancies at 
cost  k (v) , generalizing formulations where 
they pay  k to post  v = 1 . At the level of an 
individual vacancy the model is unchanged, 
but aggregation differs, and if  f is strictly 
concave or  k strictly convex, firms grow to 
a finite endogenous size. Hawkins (2013) 
presents such a model with finite numbers, 
which is complicated; most subsequent work 
assumes that a firm posting  v vacancies gets 
a deterministic number of hires.
In Kaas and Kircher (2015), with a strictly 
convex  k (v) , firms wanting to grow faster post 
both higher  w and  v . The former induces 
more hires per vacancy, consistent with 
Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2013). 
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Also, they decentralize the planner’s problem, 
in contrast to many models with multi-worker 
bargaining (Stole and Zwiebel 1996; Smith 
1999; Brügemann, Gautier, and Menzio 
2019). Menzio and Moen (2010)  show how 
incomplete contracts that specify  w without 
employment guarantees imply wage floors 
that insure workers against modest, but not 
large, shocks. As in Kaas and Kircher (2015), 
they use a version of block recursivity to 
achieve tractability. Garibaldi and Moen 
(2010); Schaal (2017); and Garibaldi, Moen, 
and Sommervoll (2016) incorporate on-the-
job search, but only if  f or  k are linear; the 
general case is still outstanding.
In related work, Eeckhout and Kircher 
(2018) introduce two-sided heterogeneity 
into a large-firm model with linear  k and 
concave  f to study sorting and wage implica-
tions. Julien, Kennes, and Ritter (2018) study 
large firms as production teams, related to 
the “island matching”  model in Mortensen 
(2009). In any period, a firm can post one or 
more vacancies and may loose one or more 
workers, and may temporarily shut down 
if there is a minimum number necessary 
to operate profitably. The optimal size of a 
firm/team depends on the extent of frictions. 
Also, complementarity between workers in 
a team leads to wage dispersion, suggesting 
that recent emphasis on team production by 
human resource managers can contribute to 
inequality. This all suggests that endogenous 
firm size is an interesting area for future 
research.
9.3 Evidence
There are several approaches to assessing 
directed search. Some use observational data 
(Faberman and Menzio 2018, Marinescu 
and Wolthoff 2020, Banfi and Villena-
Roldán 2019), while others use data from 
field experiments (Dal Bo, Finan, and Rossi 
2013; Belot, Kircher, and Muller 2016), to 
see if higher wages attract more or better 
job applicants. This seems to be the case if 
one takes care that jobs are sufficiently com-
parable. Laboratory experiments have been 
used to establish that participants indeed 
seem to randomize as predicted by the 
directed search micro-foundations (Cason 
and Noussair 2007; Anbarci and Feltovich 
2013; Helland, Moen, and Preugschat 2017; 
Kloosterman 2016).41
The jury is still out on which dimensions 
the directed search approach might fail, in 
general, or fail relative to random search. 
Engelhardt and Rupert (2017), in a calibra-
tion exercise, compares competitive search 
to random search and largely rejects the 
implications of a simple competitive search 
model, although they fail to reject directed 
search with heterogeneous workers. 
Calibrations that use directed search with-
out a clear comparison to random search 
abound, and their success seems to indicate 
that this model is able to address a variety of 
relevant issues.
9.4 Miscellany
Lester, Rocheteau, and Weill (2015) study 
over-the-counter financial markets in a ver-
sion of Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005) 
with directed search. Watanabe (2010, 2020) 
considers directed search in a model of mid-
dlemen with large inventories, so they are less 
likely to stock out; in particular, if two firms 
were to merge, then if one gets  two custom-
ers and the other  zero , and if they can share 
them, it would a profitable venture. A related 
paper is Gautier, Ho, and Watanabe (2016), 
who use directed search to analyze two types 
of middleman, those who hold inventories 
they get from sellers to  retrade to buyers 
41 Other work explores how the current wage affects 
the future wages when searching on the job (Gødoy and 
Moen 2011) or how unemployment insurance affects 
search (Braun et al. 2016), which seems to indicate spill-
overs consistent with directed search. Other work focuses 
on how wages differ across employment spells (Li, Peters, 
and Xu 201 3 ,  2015 ).
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and those who offer platforms for buyers and 
sellers to trade.
Gonzalez and Shi (2010) study differences 
in worker arrival rates that are unknown 
but learned over time. This pioneers new 
ways to analyze dynamic markets. Peters 
(1991, 1994 b ) studies nonstationary mar-
kets where  n changes over time as agents 
drop out after trade. Chade, Lewis, and 
Smith (2014) and Nagypál (2004) develop 
equilibrium models of directed college 
choice where applicants can simultaneously 
send out many applications. Cheremukhin, 
Restrepo-Echavarria, and Tutino (2014) 
use rational inattention to get something 
between pure directed and random search 
(although we suggest an approach closer 
to Burdett and Judd 1983  might be easier 
and more natural). Acemoglu and Shimer 
(2000b) let agents choose how many offers to 
sample before directing their search, while 
Bethune, Choi, and Wright (2020) let them 
similarly invest in information. 
Several papers study risk aversion and 
unemployment insurance, including 
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999 a ); Rudanko 
(2009, 2011); Golosov, Maziero, and 
Menzio (2013); and Geromichalos (2015). 
In Geromichalos (2015), workers that do 
not match receive  b from the government, 
financed by a lump sum tax. This makes it 
cheap for firms to be aggressive in posting, as 
their competitors all contribute to the unem-
ployment caused by attracting more workers 
than they hire. In equilibrium, wages are too 
high and entry is too low, but this can be cor-
rected by experience rating, of if firms can 
post contracts as in Jacquet and Tan (2012). 
Golosov, Maziero, and Menzio (2013) study 
optimal unemployment insurance, and show 
it is optimal to insure workers against the risk 
of not getting hired, but not to redistribute 
across workers applying to different types 
of jobs. Herkenhoff (2019) and Herkenhoff, 
Phillips, and Cohen-Cole (2016) explore with 
risk aversion how extended credit access can 
provide insurance akin to unemployment 
insurance, and how this affects job search, 
job creation, and business cycle dynamics. 
All these ideas are interesting and merit 
additional research.
10. Conclusion
This completes our tour through the the-
ory and applications of directed search (a 
decision-theoretic concept)  and competitive 
search equilibrium (a solution concept). The 
framework contributes to our understanding 
of many phenomena, like traditional search 
theory, but in competitive search equilibrium 
the terms of trade are posted and agents 
target counterparties. Thus, prices have an 
allocative role, because those posting the 
terms compete for customers. This inter-
nalizes search externalities, and therefore 
often leads to efficiency. While this general 
message is well established, it is not always 
obvious what it means. With homogeneous 
workers, for example, it usually suffices for 
firms to post a single wage, but that is not 
the case when workers can apply to multiple 
firms, or when workers are risk averse.
Directed and random search each have 
advantages and disadvantages. First, compet-
itive search equilibrium may appeal to those 
who have philosophical issues with random 
matching, and the idea that traders cannot 
influence who they meet by their terms of 
trade (recall the Introduction). Also, it tends 
to be tractable in analyzing with otherwise 
difficult problems. With heterogeneity, for 
instance, agents may sort into submarkets, so 
they know in equilibrium what type they meet 
and that simplifies things a lot. With entry, 
we often get block recursivity, which is quite 
useful for studying, for instance, on-the-job 
search and firm dynamics. Moreover, since 
competition and efficiency emerge naturally 
in benchmark models, this provides a good 
platform for introducing complications like 
moral hazard.
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Directed search also has disadvantages. In 
some versions, it looks like those who direct 
their search can target very specific types but 
are not sure to actually meet them. Another 
strong assumption is commitment to the 
posted terms of trade. Without that, ran-
dom search and bargaining sometimes yield 
interesting and arguably realistic inefficien-
cies absent from competitive search models. 
Also, the tractability of directed search due to 
segmentation into homogeneous submarkets 
is counterfactual in some contexts, although 
more sophisticated models can have het-
erogeneity in a given submarket. Further, 
random search is sometimes easier because 
one does not have to determine submarkets 
endogenously. One can also say that directed 
search assumes agents know rather a lot, 
while random search assumes they know very 
little, and reality is somewhere in between. 
As mentioned, there are attempts to study 
intermediate cases, and this seems promising.
Competitive search is a tractable and nat-
ural way to model competition among con-
tracts and makes it relatively straightforward 
to study both finite markets and limiting 
large markets. Again, the theory captures the 
idea that if you post more favorable terms 
potential customers come to you with higher 
probability, but not generally with proba-
bility  1 . Agents on both sides of the market 
take into account prices and trading proba-
bilities, a generalization of standard GE the-
ory. In particular, with homogeneous buyers 
and sellers the price and probability of trade 
are the same everywhere, but the option to 
post different terms, and to search differ-
ently, disciplines equilibrium behavior. For 
these reasons and more, the framework is 
extremely useful, and its future seems bright. 
We hope this essay inspires readers to learn 
more about it and to continue contributing 
to its development.
Appendix A
We consider two scenarios. The first has indivisible  q , like our baseline model, 
but does not necessarily have perfectly  transferable utility: if a buyer makes a pay-
ment  p to a seller, the latter gets  ν (p) while former gets  − γ (p) , where  ν (0) = γ (0) = 0 , 
 ν ′ (q) > 0 ,  γ ′ (q) > 0 ,  ν ″ (q) ≤ 0 , and  γ ″ (q) ≥ 0  ∀ q > 0 . Transferable utility, as in subsection 
2.1, is the special case,  ν (p) = γ (p) = p . The generalization of problem (1) is
 V s =  max p,n α (n) [ν (p) − c] subject to   
α (n)  _n [u − γ (p) ] =  V b . 
Form the Lagrangian
  = α (n) [ν (p) − c] + Λ { 
α (n)  _n [u − γ (p) ] −  V b } . 
The FOCs are:
    n =  α ′ (ν − c) +  
Λ (u − γ) (n α ′ − α)   _______________
 n 2 
 = 0 ,
    p = α ν ′ −  Λα _n γ ′ = 0 ,
    Λ =  
α (n)  _n (u − γ) −  V b = 0 .
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Now   p = 0 ⇒ Λ = n ν ′ / γ ′ and   n = 0 ⇒ ε (ν − c) γ ′ =  (1 − ε) (u − γ) ν ′ , like Nash 
bargaining except  ε = n α ′ (n) / α (n) replaces  θ . At any solution to the FOCs, the bordered 
Hessian is




 α″(u − γ)ν′ _______εγ′ +  
2α(1 − ε)(u − γ)ν′  ___________
 n 2 γ′
 
 
 αν′ __n 
 
− α(1 − ε)(u − γ)  __________
 n 2 
 
    αν′ __n   
α(γ′ν″ − ν′γ″) ________γ′  − 
αγ′ __n   
− α(1 − ε)(u − γ)  __________
 n 2 
 
 







and its determinant, after simplification, is
 |H| = − ( α _n) 
2
 (u − γ) [ 
 α ″ ν ′ γ ′  _ε +  
α  (1 − ε) 2 (u − γ) ( γ ′ ν ″ −  ν ′ γ ″ )    ________________________ 
 n 2 γ ′ 
 ] . 
Standard assumptions on  α ,  ν , and  γ imply  |H| > 0 , so the SOCs hold. As a special case this 
applies to  ν (p) = γ (p) = p . Also, the same method applies to the dual problem (4).
Now consider divisible goods with  p fixed, as in subsection 3.1’s credit model with a bind-
ing constraint, where  p = L , or subsection 4.1’s monetary model with indivisible assets, 
where  p = βΔ . Form the Lagrangian
   = α (n) [p − c (q) ] + Λ { 
α (n)  _n [u (q) − p] −  V b } . 
With  p is fixed, the FOCs are:
  n =  α ′ (p − c) +  
Λ (u − p) (n α ′ − α)   _______________
 n 2 
 = 0 ,
   q = − α c ′ +  Λα _n u ′ = 0 ,
   Λ =  
α (n)  _n (u − p) −  V b = 0 .
Now   q = 0 implies  Λ = n c ′ / u ′ . Then   n = 0 implies  ε (p − c) u ′ =  (1 − ε) (u − p) c ′ , 
or  p = g (q, n) with  g (q, n) given by (16), again like generalized Nash except  ε replaces  θ . At 
any solution to the FOCs, the bordered Hessian is





α″(u − p) _______ε  
c′ __ 
u′ +  
2α(1 − ε)(u − p)  ___________
 n 2 
  c′ __ 
u′
 
− αc′ __n 
 
− α(1 − ε)(u − p)  __________
 n 2 
 
    − αc′ __n   
α(c′u″ − u′c″) ________
u′   
αu′ __n    
− α(1 − ε)(u − p)  __________
 n 2 
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and its determinant is
 |H| = − ( α _n) 
2
 (u − p) [ 
 α ″ c ′ u ′  _ε +  
α  (1 − ε) 2 (u − p) ( c ′ u ″ −  u ′ c ″ )    ________________________ 
 n 2 u ′ 
 ] . 
Standard assumptions imply  |H| > 0 , so again the SOCs hold. 
Appendix B
Recall the continuous-time planner problem in subsection 3.2. Normalizing the measure 
of households to  N s = 1 , we let the state variable be employment  e , and let the control 
be the measure of vacancies posted  v . The law of motion is  e ˙ =  (1 − e) α (n) − δe , where 
 n = v / (1 − e) . Denote the value function by  J (e) and write the problem as
(71)  rJ (e) =  max v {ey +  (1 − e) b − vk +  J ′ (e) [ (1 − e) α ( 
v _ 
1 − e) − δe] } . 
In case it is not obvious, we derive this, following Shimer (2004). Consider the integral form 
of the problem
  J [e (t) ] =  ∫ t
∞
 e −r (s−t)  {e (s) y −  [1 − e (s) ] b − vk} ds. 
The objective function is household utility net of vacancy posting costs. Differentiating with 
respect to time, we get
  J ′ [e (t) ] e ˙(t) = − e (t) y −  [1 − e (t) ] b + rJ [e (t) ] . 
Using this to replace  e ˙(t) in the objective function, we arrive at (71).
One can show the value function is linear,  J (e) =  A 0 +  A 1 e . This is easiest in discrete time, 
as in Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005), where it is easy to check the mapping analogous to 
(71) is a contraction, with  J (e) its unique fixed point. It is also easy to check that this mapping 
takes linear functions into linear functions. Since the set of linear functions is closed, the fixed 
point  J (e) is linear. To get the result in continuous time one can taking the limit of the discrete 
time model as the period length shrinks to  0 , a standard technique in search theory (e.g., 
Mortensen 1986). See Wright (2013) for more details.
Therefore the FOC is
(72)  k =  A 1 α ′ ( 
v _ 
1 − e) , 
which implies  n = v / (1 − e) is independent of  e . Differentiating (71), we get
(73)  r  A 1 = y − b −  A 1 [α ( 
v _ 
1 − e) −  α ′ ( 
v _ 
1 − e)  
v _ 
1 − e + δ] . 
Using (73) to eliminate  A 1 from (72), we arrive at  T (n) = 0 , the steady state equilibrium con-
dition in the text. Hence, at every point in time, the planner’s  n is the same as the steady state 
equilibrium  n . 
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Appendix C
Recall on-the-job search from subsection 3.2. We claim there is a  w 
¯
such that workers 
employed at  w ≥  w 
¯
stop searching. To begin, for a worker employed at  w 1 searching for  w 1 ′
and another employed at  w 2 >  w 1 searching for  w 2 ′, the fact that both are behaving optimally 
implies
  α [n ( w 2 ′) ] [ V s1 ( w 2 ′) −  V s1 ( w 2 ) ] ≥ α [n ( w 1 ′) ] [ V s1 ( w 1 ′) −  V s1 ( w 2 ) ] ,
  α [n ( w 2 ′) ] [ V s1 ( w 2 ′) −  V s1 ( w 1 ) ] ≤ α [n ( w 1 ′) ] [ V s1 ( w 1 ′) −  V s1 ( w 1 ) ] . 
Now subtraction implies
  α [n ( w 2 ′) ] [ V s1 ( w 1 ) −  V s1 ( w 2 ) ] ≥ α [n ( w 1 ′) ] [ V s1 ( w 1 ) −  V s1 ( w 2 ) ] . 
Since  V s1 (w) is strictly increasing,  V s1 ( w 1 ) <  V s1 ( w 2 ) and hence  α [n ( w 2 ′) ] < α [n ( w 1 ′) ] . So 
the worker employed at  w 2 searches in a submarket with a higher wage and lower success rate 
than the worker employed at  w 1 .
We now show there is a minimum wage increment Δ workers require to justify search cost  κ . 
The gain  V s1 ( w 0 ) −  V s1 (w) is bounded by  ( w ′ − w) / (ρ + δ) , the difference in wages over the 
maximum time on a job until exogenously destroyed. A employed worker that searches needs a 
gain that at least makes up for the cost,  V s1 ( w 0 ) −  V s1 (w) ≥ κ . Hence,  κ ≤  ( w ′ − w) / (ρ + δ) , 
or  Δ ≥ κ ( w ′ − w) . In particular, if  w is high enough, a worker stops searching.
Appendix D
Consider auctions instead of posting in the  n b ×  n s market. For seller  i the payoff is  u − c 
unless only  one buyer shows up, in which case it is  p i − c , or no buyers show up, in which case 
it is  0 . Therefore,
(74)  V si =  n b  γ i  (1 −  γ i )  n b −1 ( p i − c) +  [1 −  n b  γ i  (1 −  γ i )  n b −1 +  (1 −  γ i )  n b  ] (u − c) . 
For a buyer the payoff from visiting seller  i is  u −  p i if he is alone, and  0 otherwise. In equilib-
rium where buyers mix, therefore,
(75)  (1 −  γ i )  n b −1 (u −  p i ) =  (1 −  γ j )  n b −1 (u −  p j ) . 
Suppose seller  i deviates to  p i . Given buyers mix symmetrically,  γ 1 +  ( n s − 1)  γ j = 1 , and
(76)  (1 −  γ i )  n b −1 (u −  p i ) =  (1 −  
1 −  γ i  _
 n s − 1
 ) 
 n b −1
 (u −  p j ) . 
Implicit differentiation and simplification implies
 ∂ γ i  _∂ p i 
= − 
 (1 − γ) ( n s − 1)   _______________ 
 ( n b − 1) (u − p)  n s 
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around the equilibrium values of  p i = p and  γ = 1 / n s . Taking the FOC from maximizing  V si 
with respect to  p i and simplifying, we get
 p =  
 (n −  
1 _  n s ) u +  ( n s − 2 +  
1 _  n s ) c   ______________________
n +  n s − 2
 . 
As  n b ,  n b → ∞ holding  n fixed,  p → c and  π →  (1 −  e −n − n  e −n ) (u − c) . This is the same 
as the payoff under posting. 
Appendix E
Consider any CRS technology  μ ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) and let  n =  n 1 / n 2 . We claim  σ (n) ≷ 1 ⇔  ε ′ (n) ≷ 0 , 
where  ε (n) = n α ′ (n) / α (n) , and  σ (n) is the elasticity of substitution,
(77)  σ (n) =  dn _ 
d ( μ 2 / μ 1 ) 
 
 μ 2 / μ 1  _n . 
As in standard production theory,  σ measures the degree of complementarity between inputs. 
Clearly,  μ ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) =  n 2 α (n) =  n 1 α (n) / n , which implies  μ 1 =  α ′ (n) and  μ 2 = α (n) −  α ′ (n) n . 
Therefore,  μ 2 / μ 1 = α (n) / α ′ (n) − n and  d ( μ 2 / μ 1 ) / dn = − α (n) α ″ (n) / α ′ (n) 2 . Given this, 
(77) implies
 σ (n) = − 
 α ′ (n) 2  _ 
α (n) α ″ (n) 
 
α (n) −  α ′ (n) n  ____________
n α ′ (n) 
 = − 
 α ′ (n) [1 − ε (n) ]   _____________
 α ″ (n) n
 . 
Now algebra implies
  ε ′ (n) =  
 [ α ″ (n) n +  α ′ (n) ] α (n) − n α ′ (n) α ′ (n)    ______________________________ 
α  (n) 2 
 
 =  
 α ′ (n)  _
α (n) 
 [1 − ε (n) ] [1 − 1 / σ (n) ] . 
This proves  ε ′ (n) ≷ 0 ⇔ σ (n) ≷ 1 .
For the specification  μ ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) =  n 2 (1 −  e − n 1 / n 2  ) discussed in section 5,  α (n) = 1 −  e −n 
and  ε (n) = n  e −n / (1 −  e −n ) . Moreover,
  σ (n) =  1 −  e 
−n − n  e −n   ____________ 
n (1 −  e −n ) 
 < 1, 
 ε ′ (n) =  
 e −n (1 −  e −n − n)   ______________ 
 (1 −  e −n ) 2 
 < 0, 
because  1 −  e −n < n . As discussed in section 4, another common specification, especially 
in monetary economics following Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993), is  μ ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) = 
 n 1  n 2 / ( n 1 +  n 2 ) . This implies  α (n) = n / (1 + n) ,  σ (n) = 1 / 2 ,  ε (n) = 1 / (1 + n) , 
and  ε ′ (n) = − 1 / (1 + n) 2 < 0 . The CES function is  μ ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) =  ( n 1 a +  n 1 a) 1/a , where  a ∈ 
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(− ∞, 1) . This implies  α (n) =  (1 +  n a ) 1/a ,  σ (n) = 1 / (1 − a) , and  ε (n) =  n a / (1 +  n a ) . Clearly, 
 σ ≷ 1 ⇔ a ≷ 0 ⇔  ε ′ (n) = a n γ−1 / (1 +  n a ) 2 ≷ 0 , providing a simple example with  ε ′ > 0 . 
A special case is the Cobb–Douglas function,  μ ( n 1 ,  n 2 ) =  n 1 a  n 2 1−a , which implies  α (n) = 
 n a ,  σ (n) = 1 and  ε ′ (n) = 0 . 
Appendix F
Standard results imply the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints can 
be rewritten
(78)  v ( t 2 ,  t 2 ) = v ( t ¯2 ,  t ¯2 ) +  ∫  t ¯2  
 t 2 
 e (s) ds, 
plus  v ( t ¯2 ,  t ¯2 ) ≥ 0 and  e ( ∙ ) nondecreasing. Using (78), we obtain
  ∫ t∈ 
 
 v ( t 2 ,  t 2 ) d N 2 ( t 2 ) = v ( t ¯2 ,  t ¯2 ) +  ∫ t∈ 
 
  ∫  t 
¯2
  
 t 2 
 e (s) ds  n 2 ( t 2 ) d t 2 . 
After integrating the last term by parts, we rewrite this as
  ∫ t∈ 
 
 v ( t 2 ,  t 2 ) d N 2 ( t 2 ) = v ( t ¯2 ,  t ¯2 ) +  ∫ t∈ 
 
  
1 −  N 2 ( t 2 )  _
 n 2 ( t 2 ) 
 e ( t 2 ) d N 2 ( t 2 ) . 
Using this and the definition of  v ( t 2 ,  t 2 ) , we rewrite  v ( t ¯2 ,  t ¯2 ) ≥ 0 as
  ∫ t∈ 
 
 e (t) [t − p (t) −  
1 −  N 2 ( t 2 )  _
 n 2 ( t 2 ) 
 ] d N 2 ( t 2 ) ≥ 0. 
Hence, the relevant problem is:
 U =  max 
 e (∙) ,p (∙) ,n 
  
α (n)  _n ∫  t 2 ∈ 
 
 e ( t 2 ) [ t 2 − p ( t 2 ) ] d N 2 ( t 2 ) 
 subject to
  ∫  t 2 ∈ 
 
 e ( t 2 ) [ t 2 − p ( t 2 ) −  
1 −  N 2 ( t 2 )  _
 n 2 ( t 2 ) 
 ] d N 2 ( t 2 ) ≥ 0 ,
  α (n) ∫ t∈ 
 
  e ( t 2 ) p ( t 2 ) d N 2 ( t 2 ) = k.
 Using the second constraint to eliminate  p ( t 2 ) , we reduce this to
 α (n) ∫  t 2 ∈ 
 
 e ( t 2 ) p ( t 2 ) d  N 2 ( t 2 ) = k .
This is the problem discussed in the text.  ∎ 
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